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 PRIORITIZING JUSTICE: COMBATING 
CORPORATE CRIME FROM TASK FORCE  
TO TOP PRIORITY 
MARY KREINER RAMIREZ* 
Inadequate law enforcement against corporate criminals appears to have 
created perverse incentives leading to an economic crisis—this time in the 
context of the subprime mortgage crisis.  Prioritizing Justice proposes 
institutional reform at the Department of Justice (DOJ) in pursuing corporate 
crime.  Presently, corporate crime is pursued nationally primarily through the 
DOJ Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force and other task forces, the DOJ 
Criminal Division Fraud Section, and the individual U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices.  
Rather than a collection of ad hoc task forces that seek to coordinate policy 
among a vast array of offices and agencies, a Corporate Crimes Division 
should be created as a permanent base in the DOJ to combat the relentless 
waves of corporate criminality.  The Corporate Crimes Division would more 
efficiently investigate and prosecute crimes of national and multinational 
corporations spanning multiple districts, and pursue a coordinated national 
policy that affirms the commitment of the DOJ to fight large-scale corporate 
crime which costs taxpayers billions of dollars, frustrates financial markets, 
increases the cost of capital to honest businesses, and undermines citizens‘ 
confidence in the rule of law.  Given the cost of corporate crime, creating the 
division would promote superior institutional design that should yield 
substantial benefit. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
If they aren‘t out there looking for fraud, it‘s a good bet they 
won‘t find it.1 
Once again, inadequate law enforcement against corporate criminals 
appears to have created perverse incentives leading to an economic crisis—
this time in the context of the subprime mortgage crisis.
2
  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) recently announced that it plans to enhance its 
civil enforcement capabilities.
3
  There have also been scattered criminal 
actions addressing isolated wrongdoing by lesser known individuals.
4
  In the 
summer of 2009, the SEC leveled civil charges against Angelo Mozilo, the 
CEO of Countrywide Financial Corporation.
5
  Yet, as of the fall of 2009, no 
criminal charges had been filed against any major firm or any high-profile 
CEO.
6
  Moreover, all of the limited law enforcement activity mentioned above 
occurred only after the crisis.  Enforcement laxity had distorted incentives 
facing putative white-collar criminals long before. 
 
1. Emily Barker et al., Progress Report, AM. LAW. & CORP. COUNS. (LITIGATION 2007: 
CORPORATE FRAUD), Fall 2007, at 35, 39 (reporting on the decline in corporate fraud investigations 
beginning in 2004). 
2. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Obama‘s Ersatz Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A31. 
3. Jonathan Stempel, SEC Plans More Subpoena Power, Enforcement Units, Reuters (Aug. 5, 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57504V20090806. 
4. See, e,g., Michael A. Fletcher, Former Fund Managers Face Fraud Charges in Credit 
Crisis, WASH. POST, June 20, 2008, at A1. 
5. Stempel, supra note 3; see also Kara Scannell & John R. Emshwiller, Countrywide Chiefs 
Charged with Fraud, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, at C1 (reporting that civil securities charges were 
filed by the SEC against former Countrywide executives CEO Angelo Mozilo, COO David Sambol, 
and CFO Eric Sieracki, and that a federal criminal investigation is ongoing).  
6. Martha Graybow & Randal Mikkelsen, Subprime Criminal Probes Yet to Catch Big Fish, 
Reuters (June 9, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0945592020080610.  The lack of high-
profile cases may be attributed in part to the difficulty in investigating white-collar crime, the 
complexity of the cases, and the high burden of proof in criminal cases.  See id. 
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Presently the United States prosecutes corporate crime through several 
different avenues: the Criminal Division of the United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ) polices national policy throughout the DOJ divisions, agencies, 
and U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices.7  The Criminal Division also takes on significant 
litigation that includes prosecution of white-collar crime through its Fraud 
Section.  That section addresses a variety of criminal practices including those 
related to consumer fraud, identity theft, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act.
8
  The DOJ has established several task forces dedicated to or 
substantially related to corporate crime: the Financial Fraud Enforcement 
Task Force, the Corporate Fraud Task Force, the Enron Task Force, and the 
National Procurement Fraud Task Force.
9
  The task forces coordinate efforts 
among the Attorney General and relevant departments, agencies, and offices 
of the United States. 
Rather than combating the relentless waves of corporate criminality with a 
collection of ad hoc task forces that seek to coordinate policy among a vast 
array of offices and agencies, the DOJ should create a Corporate Crimes 
Division as a permanent base in the department from which to pursue national 
policy and to more efficiently investigate and prosecute such crimes.  The 
mission of the Corporate Crimes Division would be to specialize in 
investigating and prosecuting corporate crime by developing expertise that 
includes legal and related professional expertise, as well as considering and 
recommending national policy regarding that mission.  The time taken to 
investigate major corporate criminal acts is costly to the typical U.S. 
Attorney‘s Office tasked with pursuing a wide variety of both criminal and 
civil cases, as well as defending the United States, its agents, and its officers 
in wide-ranging civil suits.
10
  Consequently, such corporate criminal cases can 
only be pursued in local U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices at the expense of other cases, 
many of which are easier to investigate and less costly to prosecute.  For the 
numbers-driven manager focused on reporting high conviction numbers to 
support office funding, the long-run potential for convictions in corporate 
crime cases may seem slight compared to the short-run costs.
11
  Moreover, 
pursuing powerful corporations in one‘s district has the added disadvantage of 
 
7. United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division Homepage, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ (last visited July 14, 2010) [hereinafter Criminal Division Homepage]. 
8. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, FRAUD SECTION ACTIVITIES REP. 5 
(2007), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/2007/actrpt07.pdf. 
9. See infra Part III.A. 
10. See DAVID O. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 278 (3d ed. 2007). 
11. See generally U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., FY 2008 
PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (2008), http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2008/ 
2008par.pdf [hereinafter FY 2008 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT]. 
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creating potential political difficulties for the U.S. Attorney, and possibly 
limiting employment prospects for those who leave government service and 
hope to gain employment with the private sector.
12
 
A Corporate Crimes Division would offer a superior institutional design.
13
  
It would sharpen the expertise of the lawyers, economists, accountants, 
financial analysts, and related professionals within the narrow focus of its 
mission.  That expertise could then be efficiently employed to pursue 
appropriate cases of corporate criminality.  An increase in experience and an 
undivided mission to pursue such crimes would eliminate the cost-benefit 
analysis that arises in the local U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices in selecting which 
cases to pursue.  Finally, since the decision to prosecute is made at a national 
level, the corporate wrongdoer would be less likely to improperly influence 
the decisions to investigate and prosecute. 
The estimated direct cost of economic crime outweighs the direct cost of 
street crime by measures ranging from 10 to 1, to 50 to 1.
14
  Segregating 
corporate crime from other types of economic crimes is appropriate because 
 
12. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 327–28 (crediting as sources of white-collar crime 
corruption both campaign contributions and the ―revolving door syndrome,‖ in which governmental 
employees with considerable power move into and out of private-sector positions). 
13. Among the recent articles on institutional design, several authors have applied design 
theory to matters of criminal law and procedure.  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design & 
the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 895–906  
(2009) (applying the lessons of institutional design in administrative law to propose means of curbing 
abuses of prosecutorial discretion and enhancing supervision); Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal 
Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 828–34 
(2004) (proposing default rules that rationalize apportionment of resources to better protect 
constitutional criminal procedural rights); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy & Institutional 
Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 935–37 (2003) (proposing means by which experimentalist courts 
can address the indeterminacy of problem-solving courts).  A common theme in institutional design 
is that the structure of an institution will directly impact its productive capacity in achieving positive 
results.  See, e.g., Dorf, supra, at 886.   
14. See FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 46 (identifying a variety of sources for cost estimates, 
including one comparison of $250 billion for white-collar crime to $4 billion for street crime, and 
observing that  ―economic losses . . . have been estimated as high as $1 trillion annually‖); 
FRANCIS T. CULLEN ET AL., CORPORATE CRIME UNDER ATTACK: THE FIGHT TO CRIMINALIZE 
BUSINESS VIOLENCE 17–23 (2006) (reviewing various estimates of the cost of corporate crime, and 
observing that ―[t]he tremendous economic impact of corporate lawlessness results in part from the 
extensive involvement of business in unlawful activities, but it is also due to the reality that the costs 
of even a single corporate offense are often immense‖).  Highlighting just a few of the many 
corporate frauds, the authors cited the 1973 conviction of Equity Funding Corporation of America, a 
company that in 1960 began issuing phony insurance policies, resulting in a reported $2 billion loss; 
the 1985 guilty plea by E.F. Hutton for a check kiting scheme involving nearly $10 billion; the 1980s 
crash of the savings and loan industry, which produced estimated losses of $200 billion; the 1980s 
insider trading scandal; and the exposure of widespread corporate accounting fraud beginning in 
2001 with Enron‘s collapse into bankruptcy that resulted in a loss of $60 billion in market value for 
Enron, exposed $11 billion in fraud at WorldCom, and fueled hundreds of criminal investigations 
yielding even more convictions and discovery of costly crimes.  Id. at 19–23. 
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of the complex structure of business organizations, the often-multidistrict 
effect of the criminality, and the complexity of the laws that govern corporate 
conduct, such as securities and banking laws.  It is also appropriate because 
the current institutional structure of the DOJ with respect to corporate 
criminality is grossly inadequate. 
The current approach of using task forces, such as the Financial Fraud 
Enforcement Task Force, places a Band-Aid on a gaping wound.  With 
continuous narrowing of civil avenues to address corporate misconduct, 
prosecution of corporate crime becomes critical to meaningfully protect our 
national financial structure.  Corporate crime and the resulting financial 
failures undermine confidence in our markets, reduce national and foreign 
investment in our businesses, increase the cost of doing business for all 
businesses (including the honest businesses), and impose long-term 
consequences on every person in the country through government bailouts.
15
  
These bailouts increase national debt, impose greater tax burdens on citizens 
and taxpayers, and reduce other government-sponsored, broadly applied social 
services to pay for the wrongdoing of a few.
16
 
Part II of this Article provides a historical view of the rise of the 
(multinational) corporation, and the associated crime that has followed its 
trajectory.  Part III reviews the current national approach to corporate crime.  
Part IV proposes a Corporate Crimes Division as a means of pursuing national 
policy and developing expertise in corporate crime fighting, and highlights the 
benefits of such a division.  Any change in institutional design poses 
challenges, and those challenges are raised and considered here.  Means to 
address risks associated with developing a Corporate Crimes Division and 
tempering such risks to effectuate the goals of the new division are suggested.  
This Article concludes that the benefits gained from a cohesive national 
pursuit of corporate criminality well outweigh the risks associated with such a 
pursuit.  Most significantly, every lawful citizen and business stands to gain 
when costs associated with corporate crime decrease and confidence in our 
economy and its underlying corporate structures booms.
17
 
 
15. See Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration & Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing with 
the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1057 (1999) (discussing 
the need for public confidence in the integrity of our business markets).  
16. See id. at 1056–57. 
17. Socialization of risk is a key element to corporate success.  FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 
59 (observing that corporations enjoying the benefits of success during good times lobby for 
deregulation so that they are free to exploit the maximum profits from corporate activity; however, 
corporate liability from exposure to risk is limited, and in instances when corporate criminality leads 
to harm, the government is often asked to bail out the corporation or to clean up afterward).  See, e.g., 
Stiglitz, supra note 2 (criticizing President Barack Obama‘s bailout of the banks as providing 
perverse incentives to corporate managers that reward corporate risk-taking with oversized profits 
while socializing losses to be borne by American taxpayers). 
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II.  THE RISE OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND THE  
ASSOCIATED CRIME WAVE 
A.  Corporate Growth and Dominance 
Corporations have grown exponentially.
18
  Although ―[t]he legal idea of a 
corporation can be traced back to Roman times[,] . . . the modern corporation, 
with specific corporate powers, can be recognized in the East India Company, 
founded in 1612.‖19  In 1988, the top 20% of ―the Fortune 500 corporations 
[held] a greater share of all manufacturing profits than all the other 370,000 
manufacturing firms combined[,] . . . employ[ed] well over two-thirds of all 
workers engaged in manufacturing, . . . and . . . earn[ed] about four-fifths of 
all [industrial] profits.‖20  Indeed, ―[t]hree or four corporations generally 
dominate most industries.‖21 
The growth of the modern corporation has continued through mergers and 
acquisitions, leading to increasingly complex organizational structures.
22
  
 
18. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 55–59 (tracing the historical development of the corporation 
and corporate crime). 
19. Id. at 55.  Contra RICHARD D. HARTLEY, CORPORATE CRIME: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 6 
(2008) (placing the founding of the East India Company in 1602). 
20. MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE ABUSE OF POWER 2 (1990). 
21. Id. at 3. 
22. HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 13–14; CHARLES DERBER, CORPORATION NATION: HOW 
CORPORATIONS ARE TAKING OVER OUR LIVES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 11–12, 74–80 
(1998) (observing that ―[t]he years from 1994 to 1998 set successive records as the biggest merger 
years in American history‖).   
The General Electric Company (GE), for example, is a company that has grown through 
extensive mergers and acquisitions.  Founded by Thomas Edison in 1876 with a single laboratory in 
New Jersey, today GE is one of the world‘s largest companies based on market capitalization.  FT 
US 500 2008, Fin. Times (Mar. 31, 2008), http://media.ft.com/cms/186442b8-41db-11dd-a5e8-
0000779fd2ac.pdf.  GE was actually formed by the merger of Edison General Electric and Thomson-
Houston Company in 1892.  GE, Thomas Edison & GE, http://www.ge.com/company/ 
history/edison.html (last visited July 14, 2010).  Today GE is a multinational and multi-business 
organization, comprised of several business units that include infrastructure, industrial, finance, 
media, healthcare, and consumer finance.  See GE, GE Company Organization Chart, 
http://www.ge.com/pdf/company/ge_organization_chart.pdf (last visited July 14, 2010); GE, Our 
Company, http://www.ge.com/company/index.html (last visited July 14, 2010).   
Tyco Inc., for example, was formed as an investment and holding company in 1960.  Tyco, 
Who We Are, http://www.tyco.com/wps/wcm/connect/tyco+who+we+are/Who+We+Are/History/ 
(last visited July 14, 2010) [hereinafter Tyco].  From 1973 through 2001, Tyco pursued an aggressive 
strategy of ―[g]rowth through [a]cquisitions,‖ acquiring twenty-four companies, with eighteen of 
those acquired from 1995 to 2005.  Id.  Tyco gained notoriety when its former CEO, Dennis 
Kozlowski, was convicted in 2005 for misappropriating more than $400 million of the company‘s 
funds to support an extravagant lifestyle.  Krysten Crawford, Ex-Tyco CEO Kozlowski Found 
Guilty, CNNMoney.com (June 21, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/17/news/newsmakers/ 
tyco_trialoutcome/index.htm.  By 2007, Tyco completed a separation into three different companies, 
Tyco Healthcare (now Covidien), Tyco Electronics, and Tyco International Ltd.  Tyco, supra.  In 
2009, Tyco International Ltd. moved its company‘s domicile from Bermuda to Switzerland.  Id.  It 
presently operates in all 50 states and in more than 60 countries worldwide.  Tyco, Who We Are, 
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These conglomerates ―cross-subsidize, meaning they can sustain one business 
with the profits from another.‖23  Today, many corporations have become 
conglomerates, forming holding companies and subsidiaries with a variety of 
product lines, and wielding ―political as well as economic [power] that 
extends well beyond that of the traditional large corporation operating in a 
single product line.‖24  Multinational corporations have ridden the wave of 
 
Tyco Worldwide, http://www.tyco.com/wps/wcm/connect/tyco+who+we+are/Who+We+Are/ 
Tyco+Worldwide/ (last visited July 14, 2010).   
Another example is Altria Group, Inc., which is the parent company and owns 100% of Philip 
Morris USA, U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company, John Middleton, Ste. Michelle Wine Estates, and 
Philip Morris Capital Corporation. ALTRIA GROUP, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (2009) 
http://investor.altria.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=80855&p=irol-irhome&src=top_nav (scroll to 
―Shareholder Information‖ and click ―PDF‖ link to ―2009 Annual Report‖).  Altria also holds a 
28.5% economic and voting interest in SABMiller plc.  Id.  Altria acquired Kraft Foods, Inc. in 1988 
and Nabisco in 2000, merging Kraft and Nabisco.  Brad Dorfman, Altria Sets Kraft Spinoff for 
March 30, Reuters (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWEN324120070131.  Altria 
would later spin off Kraft, and Nabisco is today a subsidiary of Kraft.  Kraft Foods, Nabisco, 
http://www.kraftfoodscompany.com/Brands/largest-brands/brands-N/nabisco.aspx (last visited July 
14, 2010).  Altria Group, Inc. was formerly known as Philip Morris Companies Inc. until it rebranded 
its name in 2003; in 2008, it spun off 100% of the shares of Philip Morris International to separate 
the international tobacco operations from the U.S. tobacco operations and clear the international 
business from United States legal and regulatory restraints.  See Altria to Spin-Off Philip Morris 
Unit, CBSNews.com (Aug. 29, 2007), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/08/29/business/ 
main3216427.shtml.  Philip Morris International operates in 160 countries with headquarters in 
Lausanne, Switzerland.  Id.  Altria Group, Inc. today is considered, according to Fortune magazine, 
the most-admired tobacco company.  Geoff Colvin, World‘s Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE, 
Mar. 16, 2009, at 75.  
23. HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 14. 
24. CLINARD, supra note 20, at 5; see also HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 13–14.  Clinard traced 
the growth of America‘s Fortune 500 and the contraction of competition in major industries through 
mergers and consolidations, and considered the expansion into international markets.  CLINARD, 
supra note 20, at 2–6.  He further connected the contributions of corporations and industry political 
action committees (PACs) to the democratic process.  Id. at 6–7.  The McCain–Feingold Act is 
bipartisan legislation designed to address the concern over the political influence wielded by these 
large conglomerates through political campaign contributions.  Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).  One of the most important provisions of 
McCain–Feingold is the prohibition of unregulated political donations or ―soft money‖ to parties or 
campaigns (―hard money‖ is regulated contributions to political parties or campaigns).  2 U.S.C. 
§ 441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2002).  McCain–Feingold was intended to close the loophole that had allowed 
corporations to give unlimited and unregulated amounts of ―soft money‖ for so-called party-building 
activities, recognizing that large corporations and wealthy individuals could exert considerably more 
influence during campaigns simply by virtue of their ability to give more money.  Albert R. Hunt, 
McCain–Feingold Did Its Job, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2004, at A19 (―[T]he declared purpose of 
McCain–Feingold . . . was to curb the corrupting nexus of big money and federal candidates . . . .‖). 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm‘n, the Supreme Court stated that ―we now 
conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.‖  130 S. Ct. 876, 909, 913 (2010) (5–4 decision 
overruling the Court‘s earlier decisions in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990), and McConnell v. Federal Election Comm‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003), that had upheld 
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act § 203 and 2 U.S.C. § 441b, and invalidating the Act‘s 
―prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for express advocacy‖ and its ―restrictions on 
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globalization by moving manufacturing jobs outside the U.S. border, and 
supporting NAFTA and other free trade agreements that permit the free flow 
of goods and services,
25
 while allowing these entities to take advantage of 
favorable legal conditions.
26
 
B.  A Brief History of Corporate Crime 
Several United States Supreme Court decisions are critical to 
understanding the legal authority and rights of modern corporations.  In 1819, 
the Court denied states‘ rights to amend corporate charters.27  In 1886, the 
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment
28
 to grant personhood to corporations, 
and afforded a corporation the right to own property and to enter binding 
contracts.
29
  This decision represented a further expansion of corporate rights, 
 
corporate independent expenditures‖).  In a vigorous dissent joined by three other Justices, Justice 
Stevens cited the extensive record in McConnell in affirming the Bipartisan Campaign Finance 
Reform Act, and traced Congress‘s concern with corporate influence over political campaigns back 
as early as 1907, in the passage of the Tillman Act, which banned corporate contributions to 
candidates.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929, 930–31, 954–57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recounting 
the history of corporate spending limits in political campaigns). 
25. NAFTA is a trilateral trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico whose 
objective is to eliminate trade barriers and facilitate cross-border movement of goods and services.  
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 102(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993).  
26. See HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 14 (regarding favorable legal conditions); U.S. GOV‘T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. TO CONG. REQUESTORS, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: LARGE U.S. 
CORPORATIONS & FEDERAL CONTRACTORS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS TAX 
HAVENS OR FINANCIAL PRIVACY JURISDICTIONS 4 (2008) (reporting that 83 of the 100 largest U.S. 
corporations have subsidiaries in tax havens or international financial privacy jurisdictions).  See also 
Press Release, Remarks by the President on Int‘l Tax Policy Reform (May 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-The-President-On-International-Tax-
Policy-Reform/ (announcing proposals to ―crack down on illegal overseas tax evasion, close 
loopholes, and make it more profitable for companies to create jobs here in the United States,‖ and to 
ensure that companies are not rewarded ―for moving jobs off our shores or transferring profits to 
overseas tax havens‖); Press Release, Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and 
Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas (May 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/LEVELING-THE-PLAYING-FIELD-CURBING-
TAX-HAVENS-AND-REMOVING-TAX-INCENTIVES-FOR-SHIFTING-JOBS-OVERSEAS/ 
(detailing the Obama Administration‘s tax proposals aimed at raising $210 billion over the next ten 
years, in part by removing tax advantages for investing overseas); supra note 22 (discussing Altria 
Group, Inc.‘s spin-off of Philip Morris International). 
27. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819). 
28. ―No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.‖  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
29. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (refusing to hear 
argument on the issue because the Court had already concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment—
which was a human rights measure adopted to address slavery—applied to corporations); see 
HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 8. 
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found in 1830 ―to be similar to those of natural persons.‖30  Key among these 
rights is the right of free speech, which underlies a corporation‘s ability to 
support political initiatives.
31
  Responsibilities came along with the rights.  
Corporations could be required to pay taxes,
32
 and in 1909, the Court 
concluded that corporations could be held criminally liable for the acts of its 
agents:
33
 
It is true that there are some crimes, which in their nature 
cannot be committed by corporations.  But there is a large class 
of offenses . . . wherein the crime consists in purposely doing the 
things prohibited by statute.  In that class of crimes we see no 
good reason why corporations may not be held responsible for 
and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents, 
acting within the authority conferred upon them.
34
 
Actions done by employees during their course of employment may place 
a corporation at risk of criminal liability, even in circumstances where the 
employee acted contrary to corporate policy or direction.
35
  The only time an 
organization is generally not subject to corporate liability for the criminal acts 
of employees is when a corporation is ―the object of the wrongdoing—instead 
of a mere vehicle for its perpetration.‖36 
Crime has tagged along with the corporation, and examples can be found 
throughout the history of the corporation.
37
  Indeed, investment bubbles have 
been identified going back hundreds of years to the South Sea Bubble.
38
  The 
Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth to nineteenth centuries ―gave rise 
 
30. HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 10; see also Soc‘y for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign 
Parts v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 480, 503 (1830) (holding that a corporation has the right to 
own land). 
31. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 885 (2010) (―[T]he 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker‘s corporate identity‖); 
First Nat‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1979) (implying a corporation‘s right to 
political speech under the First Amendment). 
32. See Santa Clara County, 118 U.S. at 396; HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 8. 
33. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909). 
34. Id. 
35. MORGAN LEWIS, CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS & WHITE COLLAR DESKBOOK 12-2 
(2006).   
36. 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 4.01, at 131 (2d ed. 1984). 
37. See CULLEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 13–17, 19–23 (recounting well-known criminology 
studies into the breadth of corporate crime in the United States, and major corporate crime scandals 
of the past half-century); HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 6–12. 
38. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 55–56 (―The South Sea Company was chartered in London 
in 1711 to engage in slave trade and commerce . . . .  Investors lost large fortunes because the 
enterprise was fraudulent, driven by bribery, false financial statements, and stock manipulation.‖) 
(citation omitted). 
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to [the] powerful and wealthy capitalist corporations.‖39  Corporate empires of 
the robber barons,
40
 who dominated their industries and amassed huge 
fortunes during the second half of the nineteenth century, were involved in 
every manner of bribery, stock manipulation, predation against competitors, 
price gouging, exploitation of labor, and maintenance of unsafe working 
conditions; corporations became ―largely invulnerable to legal controls.‖41  In 
the late nineteenth century, trusts
42
 engaged in monopolistic practices, which 
were addressed by the passage and enforcement of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibited agreements in restraint of trade.
43
  During the early part of the 
twentieth century, corporations grew into national entities.
44
  In the post-
World War II era, ―mergers, the formation of conglomerates, corporate 
takeovers, and the growth of transnational or multinational corporations have 
been characteristic of corporate development.‖45 
Corporate structure makes it difficult to effectively punish corporations 
because of the socialization of risk
46
 and political influence.
47
  The size of 
 
39. Id. at 56; see also HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 6–12 (tracing the history of corporate growth 
in the United States). 
40. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 56 (naming as examples John D. Rockefeller, Cornelius 
Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, Andrew Carnegie, and Henry Clay Frick). 
41. Id. (citation omitted). 
42. Id. (describing trusts as ―holding companies for a chain of corporations‖). 
43. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
44. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 56. 
45. Id.; HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 13–14; DERBER, supra note 22, at 72–75, 79, 81–90.   
46. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 59.  Risk and reward, all things being equal, are in 
proportion.  The more risk undertaken, the greater the possibility for reward and the greater the 
possibility for loss.  When risk is socialized or guaranteed by the taxpayer, however, the potential 
outcomes are disproportional, at least with respect to the corporations.  Corporations are encouraged 
to engage in even greater risks for even greater rewards, recognizing that they will not fully bear the 
greater risk.  When corporations understand that the U.S. taxpayer will bail out, guarantee, and 
socialize their risks, a moral hazard is created because corporations lose the incentive to properly 
identify and mitigate risk.  Cf. Tim Geithner, My Plan for Bad Bank Assets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 
2009, at A15.  United States Treasury Secretary Geithner discusses ―too big to fail‖ themes in 
explaining the U.S. government‘s plan to bail out major banks and other corporate institutions, 
remarking that ―[o]ur nation deserves better choices than . . . being forced to pour billions of taxpayer 
dollars into an institution like AIG to protect the economy against that scale of damage.‖  Id. 
The U.S. Department of Justice considers the collateral consequences in pursuing a corporate 
conviction on others, including ―tak[ing] into account the possibly substantial consequences to a 
corporation‘s employees, investors, pensioners, and customers, many of whom may, depending on 
the size and nature of the corporation and their role in its operations, have played no role in the 
criminal conduct, have been unaware of it, or have been unable to prevent it.‖  U.S. DEP‘T OF 
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL § 9-28.100 (2008) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ 
MANUAL], http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ (click on ―Title 9,‖ then  
―9-28.000,‖ followed by ―9-28.100‖). 
47. See HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 60–62; CLINARD, supra note 20, at 6–7; Irwin Ross, How 
Lawless Are Big Companies?, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1980, at 56–70, reprinted in CORPORATE & WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME: AN ANTHOLOGY 114 (Leonard Orland ed. 1995) (listing 188 citations of criminal 
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current multinational corporations, upon which jobs depend, creates political 
and economic resistance to criminal conviction.
48
 
III.  CURRENT NATIONAL APPROACH TO CORPORATE CRIME FIGHTING 
Presently, the United States pursues corporate crime through several 
avenues, and federal criminal prosecutions are pursued exclusively through 
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).  The DOJ is led by the U.S. 
Attorney General, who is appointed by the President.
49
  The Attorney General 
sits at the top of the DOJ organizational chart and is served by a Deputy 
Attorney General.
50
  Below those two positions is a sprawling series of offices 
and divisions that execute the responsibilities of the DOJ, including the 
litigating divisions of the DOJ that are designated to particular missions.
51
  
Each division is headed by an Assistant Attorney General, who reports either 
to the Deputy Attorney General or the Associate Attorney General.
52
  The 
 
conduct by corporations between 1970 and 1980, including 28 instances of kickbacks, bribery, or 
illegal rebates, and 21 instances of illegal political contributions); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The 
Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 966–70 (2005). 
48. See U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL, supra note 46, at § 9-28.100; Peter Spivack & Sujit 
Raman, Regulating the ‗New Regulators‘: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 165–66 (2008) (discussing Arthur Andersen‘s criminal indictment and the 
collateral consequences to the thousands of employees as highlighting the need for alternatives 
―somewhere in between the ‗all-or-nothing choice‘ between indicting (and destroying) a company 
and giving it a complete ‗pass.‘‖); Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of 
Authority: The Department of Justice‘s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 3 n.8 
(2006) (discussing the fallout from the prosecution of Arthur Andersen). 
Both Republicans and Democrats receive nearly equal political funding from major corporations 
and industries.  See Opensecrets.org, Pharmaceuticals/Health Products: Long-Term Contribution 
Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=H04 (last visited July 14, 2010).  In 
2008, pharmaceutical companies provided 50% political funding to Democrats and 50% to 
Republicans, id., while the defense industry and the finance industry provided campaign funding of 
51% to Democrats and 49% to Republicans.  Opensecrets.org, Defense: Long-Term Contribution 
Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=D (last visited July 14, 2010); 
Opensecrets.org, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term Contribution Trends, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=F (last visited July 14, 2010).  
49. 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2006) (―The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, an Attorney General of the United States.‖). 
50. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL: DOJ 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (2010), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/ag.htm#orgchart 
[hereinafter DOJ ORGANIZATIONAL CHART].   
51. Id.  The litigating divisions include the Antitrust Division, Civil Division, Civil Rights 
Division, Criminal Division, Environment and Natural Resources Division, National Security 
Division, and Tax Division.  Id.; U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF ATT‘Y RECRUITMENT & MGMT., 
A CAREER COUNSELOR‘S GUIDE TO LATERAL HIRING AT DOJ 8 (2008), http://www.justice.gov/ 
oarm/images/lateralhiringguideforweb.pdf. 
52. DOJ ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, supra note 50.  The Criminal Division, Justice 
Management Division, and National Security Division report to the Deputy Attorney General, and 
the Antitrust Division, Civil Division, Civil Rights Division, Environment and Natural Resources 
Division, and Tax Division report to the Associate Attorney General.  Id. 
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U.S. Attorney‘s Office is a litigating arm of the DOJ that maintains offices in 
ninety-four federal judicial districts located throughout the United States, 
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
53
  
The DOJ includes an Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys with a director, who 
coordinates policy among the ninety-three offices.
54
 
A.  Structural Responsibility for Corporate Crime Fighting 
One of the five statutory responsibilities of the U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices is 
the prosecution of criminal cases on behalf of the federal government.
55
  The 
U.S. Attorneys are appointed by and serve at the discretion of the President of 
the United States, with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.
56
  Although 
caseloads vary among the offices of the U.S. Attorneys, all offices are 
responsible for prosecuting criminal cases, and the U.S. Attorney for the 
judicial district is considered the chief prosecuting attorney for the United 
States within that judicial district.
57
  Despite the resource-taxing complexity of 
the investigations and prosecutions, the U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices have played a 
significant role in fighting corporate crime.
58
 
Of the DOJ divisions, six have responsibilities in investigating and 
prosecuting United States criminal laws: the Criminal Division, the Antitrust 
Division, the Civil Rights Division, the Environment and Natural Resources 
 
53. See United States Department of Justice, United States Attorneys Mission Statement, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ (last visited July 15, 2010) [hereinafter Mission Statement]; U.S. DEP‘T 
OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZATION, MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEYS (2010), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/eousa.htm#fieldmap.  
28 U.S.C. § 541(a) states, ―The President shall appoint . . . a United States attorney for each judicial 
district.‖  There are ninety-three U.S. Attorneys and ninety-four judicial districts; a single U.S. 
Attorney is assigned to Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.  United States Department of 
Justice, United States Attorneys‘ Offices Contact Information, http://www.justice.gov/usao/offices/ 
index.html#g (last visited July 15, 2010); Melissa McNamara, The Role of U.S. Attorneys, 
CBSNews.com (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/19/fyi/ 
main2583739.shtml. 
54. See United States Department of Justice, United States Attorney‘s Office, Mission and 
Functions, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/mission.html (last visited July 15, 2010). 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2006).  The offices are also responsible for representing the interests of 
the United States in civil cases, and for collecting its debts.  Id. 
56. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2: ―[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . other public Ministers and Consuls, . . . and all other Officers 
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law.‖ 
57. See Mission Statement, supra note 53. 
58. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE 2008, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT 1.5–1.14 (2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/corporate-fraud2008.pdf 
[hereinafter CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE 2008 REPORT]; U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL 
PROCUREMENT FRAUD TASK FORCE PROGRESS REPORT 6–12 (2008), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/npftf/pr/speeches-testimony/2008/12-08progress-report.pdf 
[hereinafter NATIONAL PROCUREMENT FRAUD TASK FORCE PROGRESS REPORT]. 
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Division, the National Security Division, and the Tax Division.
59
  Aside from 
the Criminal Division, each of these divisions‘ prosecutorial responsibilities 
address limited areas of law.  The Antitrust Division enforces various criminal 
statutes related to Sherman Act violations or ―prosecute[s] offenses that affect 
the integrity of [the related] investigatory process.‖60  The National Security 
Division, the most recently added division to the DOJ, investigates and 
prosecutes ―international and domestic terrorism‖ cases.61  The Criminal 
Division, however, exercises general supervision over the enforcement of ―all 
federal criminal laws except those specifically assigned to other divisions.‖62 
The Criminal Division is responsible for formulating and implementing 
criminal enforcement policy.
63
  Additionally, the division is responsible for 
―advis[ing] the Attorney General, Congress, the Office of Management 
Budget and the White House on matters of criminal law.‖64  The division 
provides leadership and also coordinates international, federal, state, and local 
law enforcement matters.
65
  Although the Criminal Division has seventeen 
separate sections,
66
 one key responsibility is particularly related to the 
proposed Corporate Crimes Division.  The responsibilities of the Fraud 
Section include the following: investigating and prosecuting sophisticated and 
multidistrict white-collar crimes such as corporate, securities, and investment 
fraud, government program and procurement fraud, and international criminal 
violations; developing department policy; and training, advising, and 
mentoring its attorneys and other professionals.
67
  These responsibilities 
would aptly fit the focus of the proposed Corporate Crimes Division. 
 
59. See U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL, supra note 46. 
60. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., AN ANTITRUST PRIMER FOR FEDERAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL (2005), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/209114.htm. 
61. United States Department of Justice, National Security Division, Mission and Functions, 
http://www.justice.gov/nsd/mission_functions.htm (last visited July 15, 2010) [hereinafter Mission 
and Functions]. 
62. Criminal Division Homepage, supra note 7.  Certain divisions, such as the Antitrust, Civil 
Rights, Environment and Natural Resources, and Tax Divisions, have authority to apply and enforce 
specific statutes assigned to those divisions. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division Organization Chart, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/about/orgchart.html (last visited July 15, 2010) [hereinafter Criminal 
Division Organization Chart].  The Criminal Division‘s major responsibilities are wide-ranging: 
counterterrorism, public integrity, domestic security, fraud, child exploitation, computer crime and 
intellectual property crime, narcotics and dangerous drugs, organized crime drug enforcement, 
organized crime, sensitive investigative techniques, special investigations, international affairs, 
assistance to foreign law enforcement institutions, policy and legislation, and appellate work.  See id.  
67. See United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ (last visited July 15, 2010). 
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Presently, the DOJ has several task forces dedicated to or substantially 
related to corporate crime.  The task forces coordinate efforts among the 
Attorney General, relevant Assistant Attorneys General (e.g., Criminal and 
Tax Divisions), relevant agencies (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation), 
offices (e.g., Homeland Security Office), and U.S. Attorneys.  One such task 
force is the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, whose stated purpose is 
strengthening the investigation and prosecution of significant financial crimes, 
recovering the proceeds, and ensuring just punishment of the perpetrators.
68
  
In addition to other DOJ officials that the Attorney General may designate, 
the members of the task force are designated by Executive Order to include 
senior-level officials from various federal departments (e.g., Justice, Treasury, 
Commerce, Labor), agencies (e.g., the SEC, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission), and offices (e.g., Thrift 
Supervision, Comptroller of the Currency, relevant Offices of Inspectors 
General).
69
  Chaired by the Attorney General,
70
 the responsibilities of the 
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force include ―provid[ing] advice . . . for 
the investigation and prosecution of [significant] cases of bank, mortgage, 
loan, and lending fraud; securities and commodities fraud; retirement plan 
fraud; mail and wire fraud; tax crimes; money laundering; False Claims Act 
violations; unfair competition; discrimination; and other financial crimes and 
violations.‖71  The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force has a narrower 
scope than its predecessor Corporate Fraud Task Force in that it does not have 
the additional responsibilities of recommending to the Attorney General the 
 
68. Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123 (Nov. 17, 2009) (establishing the task force ―in 
order to strengthen the efforts of the Department of Justice, in conjunction with [others], to investigate 
and prosecute significant financial crimes and other violations relating to the current financial crisis 
and economic recovery efforts, recover the proceeds of such crimes and violations, and ensure just and 
effective punishment of those who perpetrate financial crimes and violations‖).  The Financial Fraud 
Enforcement Task Force replaced and continues the work of the Corporate Fraud Task Force 
established by Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245–47 (2003).  Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. 
Reg. at 60,125.  The Corporate Fraud Task Force was created in the summer of 2002 to address public 
demand for a response to the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, in the face of growing revelations of 
pervasive corporate accounting fraud.  See Ramirez, supra note 47, at 956.  Market confidence 
continued to plummet during July 2002, resulting in the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002.  
Id. at 956 n.130; Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).  Like the Financial Fraud Enforcement 
Task Force, the Corporate Fraud Task Force‘s stated purpose was to ―strengthen the efforts of the 
Department of Justice and Federal, State, and local agencies to investigate and prosecute significant 
financial crimes, recover the proceeds of such crimes, and ensure just and effective punishment of 
those who perpetrate financial crimes.‖  Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. at 245. 
69. Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. at 60,123–24. The order also provides for 
coordination with state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement.  Id. at 60,124. 
70. Id. at 60,123. 
71. Id. at 60,124.  The Deputy Attorney General is tasked with designating the crimes as 
―significant.‖  Id.  
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allocation of resources, and recommending to the Attorney General and 
Congress ―changes in rules, regulations or policy to improve the effective 
investigation and prosecution of significant financial crimes.‖72  The 
responsibilities identified in the formation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force 
would be at the core of a Corporate Crimes Division, except with the added 
charge to conduct the investigation and prosecution of significant corporate 
financial crimes cases. 
Other task forces created to address corporate crime include the Enron 
Task Force, the Options Backdating Task Force, the National Procurement 
Fraud Task Force, and the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement 
Action Team.  The Enron Task Force was part of the Corporate Fraud Task 
Force
73
 and was formed to investigate and prosecute allegations of fraud and 
corruption in connection with the collapse of Enron, a multinational energy 
corporation based in Houston, Texas, which filed for bankruptcy in 2001.
74
  
At the time, the Enron bankruptcy was the most extensive and expensive 
bankruptcy ever filed.
75
  In July 2006, the FBI formed part of an Options 
Backdating Task Force, in conjunction with federal prosecutors.
76
 
The National Procurement Fraud Task Force was formed in October 2006 
―to promote the prevention, early detection, and prosecution of procurement 
 
72. Id.; Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. at 246.  Another distinction between the Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force and the Corporate Fraud Task Force is that the membership of the 
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force focuses on the various federal departments, agencies, and 
offices listed in the Executive Order, whereas the Corporate Fraud Task Force membership included 
many agencies and offices, but also identified particular U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices in which a large 
number of financial crimes were investigated and prosecuted.  The members of the [corporate fraud] 
task force are designated by Executive Order to include the Deputy Attorney General, the Assistant 
Attorneys General for the Criminal Division and the Tax Division, the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, and the United States Attorneys for the Southern District of New York, the Eastern 
District of New York, the Northern District of Illinois, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the 
Central District of California, the Northern District of California, and the Southern District of Texas.  
Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. at 245–46. 
73. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Former Enron Vice President Christopher Calger 
Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy and Agrees to Cooperate (July 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel05/calger071405.htm. 
74. See Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Federal Jury Convicts Former Enron Chief 
Executives Ken Lay, Jeff Skilling on Fraud, Conspiracy and Related Charges (May 25, 2006), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/enron/pdf/layskillingverdictfinalpr.pdf. 
75. See Ramirez, supra note 47, at 955–56 nn.125 & 128; Tammy Williamson, Largest 
Bankruptcies, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 9, 2002, at 8; see generally PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON 
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., THE ROLE OF THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON‘S COLLAPSE (Comm. Print 2002), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/senpsi70802rpt.pdf. 
76. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Corporate Fraud: Options Cases Aim for Level 
Field (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/feb07/options021407.htm [hereinafter 
Corporate Fraud: Options Cases] (noting that at the time of this press release, 61 of the 492 pending 
cases in corporate fraud involved options backdating).  
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and grant fraud.‖77  Chaired by the Assistant Attorney General for the 
Criminal Division, this task force includes representatives of the Civil, 
Criminal, Antitrust, and Tax Divisions of the DOJ, in addition to federal 
prosecutors from the U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices in various districts and 
inspectors general from various federal agencies.
78
  The task force is 
―designed to leverage the resources of the Federal law enforcement 
community by partnering with the I[nspectors] G[eneral] and other law 
enforcement agencies.‖79  In its first two years of existence, the task force 
promoted legislation to strengthen procurement fraud investigations,
80
 and 
developed training initiatives to educate and share expertise in procurement 
fraud detection, investigation, and prosecution with auditors, investigators, 
prosecutors, and procurement specialists throughout the country.
81
 
The DOJ is also a member of the International Contract Corruption Task 
Force that ―deploys criminal investigative and intelligence assets worldwide 
to detect and investigate corruption and contract fraud‖ related to the Global 
War on Terrorism.
82
  Established in October 2006, this task force is not under 
the direction of the DOJ, but rather is a joint agency task force ―led by a 
Board of Governors composed of senior agency representatives‖ involved in 
defending the interests of the United States overseas.
83
  These complex, 
resource-intensive cases involve foreign, extraterritorial and domestic 
coordination, and at times involve military and civilian cooperation in active 
combat zones.
84
 
The Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team is 
another task force expanded by the Obama Administration to ―help detect and 
prevent health-care fraud.‖85  In 2007, the DOJ and Department of Health and 
 
77. United States Department of Justice, National Procurement Fraud Task Force, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/npftf/ (last visited July 15, 2010).  The task force tracks federal civil 
and criminal procurement fraud cases.  NATIONAL PROCUREMENT FRAUD TASK FORCE PROGRESS 
REPORT, supra note 58, at 5.  Between October 2006 and December 2008, the task force tracked over 
400 civil and criminal cases, involving the DOJ‘s Criminal, Civil, and Antitrust Divisions, and forty-
five U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices, as well as numerous investigative agencies and offices.  Id. at 5–18.  
The task force is a response to a call for greater oversight of the nongovernment contractor hired to 
aid the war effort.  See, e.g., John Esterbrook, Halliburton to Pay Pentagon $6.3M, CBSNews.com 
(Jan. 23, 2004), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/23/iraq/main595277.shtml. 
78. See NATIONAL PROCUREMENT FRAUD TASK FORCE PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 58, at 
1, 5–6. 
79. Id. at 1. 
80. Id. at 2–3. 
81. Id. at 3. 
82. Id. at 13. 
83. Id.  
84. Id.  
85. See Carrie Johnson, Health-Care Fraud to be Targeted, WASH. POST, May 21, 2009, at A4 
(announcing expansion of the strike force teams to Detroit and Houston).  The task force is composed 
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Human Services launched the Medicare Fraud Strike Force.
86
  The DOJ‘s 
Criminal Division Fraud Section and U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices lead the strike 
force teams in combating fraudulent Medicare billing.
87
 
In addition to task forces, the Criminal Division Fraud Section leads or 
partners with U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices, the FBI, and other interested agencies 
in national and regional working groups related to financial crimes, including 
a Securities and Commodities Fraud Working Group, a Bank Fraud 
Enforcement Working Group, and various Mortgage Fraud Working 
Groups.
88
  Such working groups may even include international efforts to 
coordinate and prosecute financial crimes.
89
 
The Financial Crimes Section of the FBI is the primary unit in the DOJ 
tasked with investigating financial crimes such as ―corporate fraud, securities 
and commodities fraud, health care fraud, financial institution fraud, mortgage 
 
of senior-level officials at the DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services.  Id.  Since 
1997, the DOJ has coordinated with the Department of Health and Human Services to combat health 
care fraud, through the National Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control program, which uses federal, 
state, and local resources pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA).  See Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Department of Justice Efforts to Combat Health 
Care Fraud and Abuse (May 28, 2008), available at http://hcca-info.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ 
ComplianceResources/ComplianceNews/DoJ_EffortsCombatHealthCareFraudAbuse.pdf.  There 
were different phases of this strike force effort.  Id.  The Internal Revenue Service also investigates 
health care fraud tax schemes.  See Internal Revenue Service, Examples of Healthcare Fraud 
Investigations FY2008, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=174637,00.html 
(last visited July 15, 2010). 
86. See U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES & U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANN. REP. FOR FY 2007, at 9 (2008), 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2007.pdf.   
87. Id.  The task force reported significant activity in enforcement: 
In FY 2007, U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices opened 878 new criminal health care 
fraud investigations involving 1,548 potential defendants.  Federal prosecutors had 
1,612 health care fraud criminal investigations pending, involving 2,603 potential 
defendants, and filed criminal charges in 434 cases involving 786 defendants.  A 
total of 560 defendants were convicted for health care fraud-related crimes during 
the year.  Also in FY 2007, the Department of Justice (DOJ) opened 776 new civil 
health care fraud investigations, and had 743 civil health care fraud investigations 
pending at the end of the fiscal year.  The Department opened 218 new civil health 
care fraud cases during the year. 
Id. at 1. 
88. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV., FRAUD SECTION ACTIVITIES REPORT 5 
(2006), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/2006/actrpt06.pdf; Press Release, 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Dallas Div., Mortgage Fraud Background Information (June 19, 2008), 
available at http://dallas.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel08/dl061908.htm (reporting on a multiagency 
nationally coordinated fraud initiative involving forty-one mortgage fraud task forces or working 
groups and yielding 144 mortgage fraud cases and 406 defendants between March 1, 2008 and June 
18, 2008).  
89. See U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Fraud Section, Interagency Working Groups, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/working-grps/ (last visited July 15, 2010).  
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fraud, insurance fraud, mass marketing fraud, and money laundering.‖90  
Beginning with fiscal year 2003 and through fiscal year 2007, the FBI has 
participated in corporate criminal cases resulting in 183 indictments and 173 
convictions.
91
  In 2008, the FBI reported having more than 18,000 pending 
white-collar cases, of which corporate crimes cases are only one piece.
92
  The 
FBI‘s White-Collar Crime program has set a five-year strategic goal for fiscal 
years 2007 to 2012, to ―[d]ismantle a cumulative total of 745 criminal 
enterprises engaging in white-collar crime.‖93 
The membership of the various task forces highlights the breadth of 
involvement in corporate crime fighting of many agencies within the 
government and of many branches and divisions within the DOJ.  Although 
the coordination of the agencies is certainly a benefit, the heavy lifting of any 
criminal case ultimately rests with the litigators who will either press the case 
through trial or negotiate a plea or other settlement short of trial. 
B.  Success in National Corporate Crime Fighting 
Tracking the success of federal corporate crime fighting is not an easy 
task because no single accounting is made available.
94
  The DOJ collects 
statistics from the U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices, but it does not maintain a 
centralized record of corporate fraud cases.
95
  Nevertheless, in 2008 the DOJ 
reported that since July 2002, when the Corporate Fraud Task Force was 
established, the DOJ had ―obtained nearly 1,300 corporate fraud 
 
90. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FIN. CRIMES REP. TO THE PUBLIC: FISCAL YEAR 2007 
(2007), http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report2007/financial_crime_2007.htm. 
91. Id.  The FBI reported 529 pending corporate fraud cases in fiscal year 2008.  Id.  
92. Corporate Fraud: Options Cases, supra note 76.  The FBI defines white-collar crime as 
―those illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and which are 
not dependent upon the application or threat of physical force or violence.  Individuals and 
organizations commit these acts to obtain money, property, or services; to avoid the payment or loss 
of money or services; or to secure personal or business advantage.‖  CYNTHIA BARNETT, U.S. DEP‘T 
OF JUSTICE, FBI CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., THE MEASUREMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIME USING UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING (UCR) DATA 1 (NIBRS Publications Series, n.d.). 
93. FY 2008 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 11, at II-19.  
―Dismantlement means destroying the organization‘s leadership, financial base, and supply network 
such that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself.‖  Id. at II-20. 
94. Zachary Bookman, Convergences & Omissions in Reporting Corporate & White Collar 
Crime, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 347, 348 (2008) (observing that even when statistics are kept, 
the data made available to the public does not include critical information about the precise type of 
crime (e.g., embezzlement versus broad-based accounting fraud) nor the size of the crime or its 
economic impact); Leonard Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory & 
Scholarship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 509 (1980). 
95. Daphne Eviatar, Case Closed?, AM. LAW. & CORP. COUNS. (LITIGATION 2007: 
CORPORATE FRAUD), Fall 2007, at 19 (―[A]ccording to Joan Meyer, senior counsel to the deputy 
attorney general, [the DOJ] cannot provide a complete list of the cases that were the basis of the 
victories [Attorney General] Gonzales cited at the July 17[, 2007] anniversary celebration‖ of the 
DOJ‘s Corporate Fraud Task Force.). 
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convictions . . . includ[ing] convictions of more than 200 chief executive 
officers and corporate presidents, more than 120 corporate vice presidents, 
and more than fifty chief financial officers.‖96  Although the Corporate Fraud 
Task Force was created to address the massive accounting frauds discovered 
with the advent of the Enron bankruptcy filing, the number of convictions 
does not reveal the size of the corporations nor the extent of the fraudulent 
conduct.
97
  In 2008, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that, of the 
ninety-five organizations sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
forty-four were organizations with ten or fewer employees, and only seven 
were organizations with over one thousand employees.
98
  Unable to acquire 
from the DOJ an accounting of the reported 1,300 convictions, The American 
Lawyer‘s 2007 independent investigation of the DOJ‘s corporate crime 
fighting compiled a Corporate Fraud Database that included 440 indicted 
defendants arising out of 124 corporate fraud investigations.
99
  Despite being 
 
96. CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at iii (April 2, 2008, 
message from the chairman); Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, President‘s Corporate Fraud Task 
Force Marks Five Years of Ensuring Corporate Integrity (July 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr//2007/July/07_odag_507.html. 
97. See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic & Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate Crime 
Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 528 (2004).  Professor Brown observes that large, publicly 
held firms 
can afford legal assistance that matches or surpasses the government‘s, and they 
can devise policies to take full advantage of privacy protections—to make as 
much information as hard to discover as possible.  Smaller firms, as a group, 
have fewer resources with which to optimize privacy, litigate, and otherwise raise 
the government‘s costs of enforcement.  This may partly explain why most firms 
sentenced under the federal sentencing guidelines are small, closely held firms. 
Id. 
98. See U.S. SENT‘G COMM‘N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
tbl.54 (2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/Table54.pdf. 
99. See Corporate Fraud Database, AmLaw.com, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1193821435603 (last visited July 15, 2010) 
(compiled and relied upon by Barker et al., supra note 1, at 37, and Eviatar, supra note 95, at 20).  
The DOJ refused to provide The American Lawyer with a complete list of corporate fraud cases since 
2002, so the publication created its own database ―includ[ing] cases cited on the [Corporate Fraud 
Task Force] Web site and in two published task force reports, as well as corporate fraud prosecutions 
mentioned in speeches or public comments by Justice Department officials,‖ and consulted ―publicly 
available case records and performance statistics, as well as interviews with dozens of current and 
former prosecutors, task force members, and white-collar criminal defense lawyers.‖  Eviatar, supra 
note 95, at 20.  Professor Kathleen Brickey has also been tracking major corporate fraud 
prosecutions, and has examined her findings in several articles.  Kathleen F. Brickey, In Enron‘s 
Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 401, 420–33 (2006) 
[hereinafter Brickey, In Enron‘s Wake] (examining corporate fraud prosecutions related to seventeen 
major companies and firms, and reporting that forty-six defendants at those companies had gone to 
trial, covering twenty-three prosecutions between March 2002 and January 2006); Kathleen F. 
Brickey, Enron‘s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 246 (2004) [hereinafter Brickey, Enron‘s 
Legacy] (tracking nineteen major companies involving sixty-nine prosecutions and over 125 
defendants between March 2002 and July 2004); Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom 
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borne of a crisis of confidence in our corporations brought on by the collapse 
of Enron, WorldCom, and other previously well-respected corporations, the 
task force ―had no prosecutorial staff or budget of its own,‖ and ―U.S. 
Attorneys‘ offices were not given additional staff to prosecute corporate fraud 
cases.‖100  Once formed, however, the Corporate Fraud Task Force appears to 
have spurred local U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices to pursue corporate crime, at least 
initially.
101
 
The success of corporate crime fighting efforts has been scrutinized to 
evaluate the government‘s commitment to pursuing corporate criminals and to 
assess its tactics.  Of the 440 cases tracked by The American Lawyer, 57% of 
those defendants pled guilty, and 21% of the cases that went to trial ended in 
acquittals.
102
  Moreover, over fifty convictions resulted in sentences of 
imprisonment of greater than five years.
103
  In Professor Kathleen Brickey‘s 
2004 study of nineteen companies involving 125 defendants, seventy-three of 
eighty-nine convictions (about 82%) were by guilty plea.
104
  But by 2006, less 
than half of the defendants in the study pled guilty.
105
  Moreover, throughout 
the Brickey study, results from criminal trials of defendants were mixed with 
eighteen convictions, eleven acquittals, and fifteen deadlocks.
106
  The 
American Lawyer Corporate Fraud Database indicates that twenty-seven 
defendants were acquitted at trial, twenty-eight cases were dismissed, twenty-
two cases were declared mistrials, and nine convictions were reversed on 
 
and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes–Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 358 app. A at 382 (2003) 
(explaining that between March 2002 and August 2003, over ninety defendants were criminally 
charged). 
100. Eviatar, supra note 95, at 24, 30.  The American Lawyer reports that the U.S. Attorney‘s 
Office for the Southern District of New York in Manhattan ―actually lost about $5 million in 
personnel and other assistance from the SEC‖ during the 2002-to-2007 time period, although the 
DOJ would not confirm this information.  Id. at 24.  One of the lead prosecutors in the trial of Enron 
Chairman Ken Lay and CEO Jeffrey Skilling acknowledged a ―lack of resources, both technical and 
in terms of personnel,‖ including the lack of resources to even ―create a searchable electronic 
database of Enron documents until shortly before trial.‖  Id.  But see Christine Hurt, The 
Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 379 (2008) (citing Alice Fisher et al., 
Encouraging Corporate Responsibility Through Criminal Enforcement, in 3 THE PRACTITIONER‘S 
GUIDE TO THE SARBANES–OXLEY ACT, at VII-1-2 (John J. Huber et al. eds., 2006) (―With the Task 
Force came a $24.5 million increase in the DOJ‘s budget for corporate fraud investigations and a 
73% budget increase for the SEC.‖). 
101. See Eviatar, supra note 95, at 20. 
102. See Barker et al., supra note 1, at 37. 
103. See Eviatar, supra note 95, at 20. 
104. See Brickey, In Enron‘s Wake, supra note 99, at 403 tbl.2 (reporting on results from 
earlier study addressed in Brickey, Enron‘s Legacy, supra note 99, at 246). 
105. Brickey, In Enron‘s Wake, supra note 99, at 404 tbl.3 (of thirty defendants, thirteen pled 
guilty, seven received guilty verdicts after trial, three received not guilty verdicts, and seven cases 
resulted in mistrials). 
106. Id. at 407. 
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appeal.
107
  Both Professor Brickey and The American Lawyer nod toward the 
idea of poor lawyering by the DOJ as potentially contributing to the 
nonconvictions;
108
 however, in evaluating the ―losses,‖ Brickey does not 
dismiss the ―issues of complexity, witness credibility, juror sophistication, and 
myriad unquantifiable factors‖ that play into the results.109  Certainly, proving 
accounting fraud through numerous witnesses, financial experts, and hundreds 
of documents is substantially more complicated than proving the average drug 
deal on the street.
110
 
The Corporate Fraud Task Force has been criticized as being an 
instrument created to calm market fears in the summer of 2002, rather than a 
true force of change in prosecutorial approach to corporate crime.
111
  The 
Corporate Fraud Database identified 357 indictments in major corporate fraud 
cases between formation of the task force in 2002 and 2005; the number of 
indictments dropped substantially after that time period with only fourteen 
cases identified by the DOJ as significant cases in 2006, and only twelve 
major case indictments in the first nine months of 2007.
112
  With the spotlight 
 
107. See Eviatar, supra note 95, at 20; Barker et al., supra note 1, at 37 (for those cases that 
went to trial, 62% resulted in guilty verdicts, 21% resulted in acquittals, and 17% in mistrials; 
moreover, 12% of the guilty verdicts were overturned on appeal); Corporate Fraud Database, supra 
note 99. 
108. See Brickey, In Enron‘s Wake, supra note 99, at 407 (―[A]t first blush, the government‘s 
trial record does not reflect overwhelming success and appears to validate—or at least provide 
support for—the criticism that prosecutors have overreached by trying to find crimes where none 
really exist.‖); Eviatar, supra note 95, at 20 (―Among the cases highlighted on the task force Web site 
we found several high-profile acquittals, hung juries, and appellate reversals—and some of those 
prosecution failures were due specifically to questionable tactics by the Justice Department.‖). 
109. Brickey, In Enron‘s Wake, supra note 99, at 410. 
110. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 278. 
Corporate and finance crime cases in particular require large expenditures of 
time and special investigative skills, involve greater difficulties in establishing 
criminal intent, and pose problems in obtaining appropriate witness or victim 
cooperation.  These cases may require sifting through masses of dull and 
difficult-to-understand records, and the evidentiary issues are especially 
complex. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
111. Eviatar, supra note 95, at 30 (―The Corporate Fraud Task Force was just one star in a 
larger constellation of government efforts to calm investors in an escalating financial crisis.‖).  ―The 
mandate has always been not to strangle corporate America, but to put investor confidence back into 
the market, which I think we have.‖  Id. (quoting Debra Wong Yang, former U.S. Attorney in Los 
Angeles and an original member of the Corporate Fraud Task Force). 
112. Id. at 21; see also Corporate Fraud Database, supra note 99; CORPORATE FRAUD TASK 
FORCE 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at 1.3–1.22.  The Corporate Fraud Task Force reported that 
between July 2002 and May 2004, prosecutors had ―[o]btained over 500 corporate fraud convictions 
or guilty pleas [and c]harged over 900 defendants and over 60 corporate CEOs and presidents with 
some type of corporate fraud crime in connection with over 400 filed cases.‖  U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, 
CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2.3 (2004), 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/2nd_yr_fraud_report.pdf. 
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shifted away from corporate wrongdoing, the government shifted resources 
aimed at corporate fraud away from investigation and enforcement.
113
  Most 
of the cases listed in the American Lawyer database and in the DOJ‘s 2008 
report were brought solely by U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices.114  Indeed, a handful of 
local U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices with locations in major metropolitan areas 
prosecuted a majority of the cases.
115
  Contrary to DOJ claims that the decline 
in investigations and prosecutions marks the success of the corporate fraud 
initiative,
116
 continued reports of corporate fraud and wrongdoing in the news, 
and the meltdown in the financial markets suggests that more needs to be 
done.
117
 
 
113. See Hurt, supra note 100, at 380 (warning that a shift away from criminal enforcement of 
corporate wrongdoing should not occur without strengthening private enforcement laws that were left 
―untouched by post-Enron reforms‖); Carrie Johnson, SEC Enforcement Cases Decline 9%, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 3, 2006, at D3 (reporting on recent budget cuts and hiring freezes at the SEC); Eric 
Lichtblau et al., F.B.I. Struggling to Handle Wave of Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at 
A1 (reporting a loss of 625 agents (36% of the FBI‘s 2001 levels) for white-collar crime 
investigations as the Administration shifted its focus to antiterrorism).  ―[E]xecutives in the private 
sector say they have had difficulty attracting the bureau‘s attention in cases involving possible frauds 
of millions of dollars.‖  Lichtblau et al., supra. 
114. See Corporate Fraud Database, supra note 99.  The database lists the prosecutors from each 
case and the location of the prosecutor at the time of prosecution.  Id.  In addition to cases brought by 
the Enron Task Force, some were filed by attorneys from the Criminal or Tax Divisions of the DOJ, 
either alone or in conjunction with the local U.S. Attorney‘s Office.  See id.  The 2008 Corporate 
Fraud Task Force Report to the President identified six major cases brought by the Criminal Division 
(which includes the Enron Task Force), four major cases brought by the Tax Division, and fifty-one 
major cases brought by U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices, and one joint Criminal Division/U.S. Attorney‘s 
Office prosecution.  See CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at 1.3–1.19. 
115. Although the bulk of the cases were brought by the U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices in New York 
(Southern District of New York), Chicago (Northern District of Illinois), and San Francisco 
(Northern District of California), cases were filed in another twenty-five districts, including the 
Southern District of Texas (in which the Enron cases were filed—although many of these cases were 
brought by the Enron Task Force due to conflicts of interest within the U.S Attorney‘s Office in 
Houston).  Barker et al., supra note 1, at 38. 
116. Id. at 39. 
117. See Evan Perez & Kara Scannell, FBI Launches Subprime Probe, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 
2008, at A3 (reporting that the FBI ―is working with the SEC, which has opened more than three 
dozen investigations in the subprime-mortgage business, including the role of mortgage brokers, 
investment banks and due-diligence companies involved in the underwriting and securitization of 
loans‖); M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2007) (noting that backdating options cost shareholders an average of 
$389 million in market capitalization, compared to an average gain of about $500,000 in additional 
executive compensation); see also Barker et al., supra note 1, at 39 (plotting on multiple graphs the 
decline in investigations and indictments (peaked in 2003), guilty pleas (peaked in 2003), and trial 
outcomes (peaked in 2004) since the Corporate Fraud Task Force became operational).  Notably, the 
number of investigations, indictments, and guilty pleas for the years 1994 through 1999 were 
negligible.  Id.  The fallout from the subprime mortgage crisis goes beyond the criminal 
investigations, and has worldwide effects, including the U.S. government bailout of banks and 
insurance companies, tightening of credit, record job losses, and spiraling national debt.  See 
Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54 
2010] COMBATING CORPORATE CRIME 993 
Criminal prosecutions occur after a crime has already been committed.  
Thus, while some would argue prosecutions can deter future crimes by 
assuring punishment, it is generally performed after the fact.  Yet, with 
corporate crime, the criminal acts are often ongoing and persistent so that 
early discovery and prosecution can prevent greater losses.
118
  In 2006, 
Professor Erik Lie conducted a study of options and discovered that 
backdating of options awarded to corporate executives as incentives was 
rampant.
119
  After The Wall Street Journal persisted in investigating the 
backdating scandal, the DOJ and FBI formed a task force to investigate and 
prosecute the crimes.
120
  Thus, the DOJ did finally step in to prosecute, but not 
in advance of an investigation spurred by the private sector.  Likewise, as 
early as 2004, the FBI suspected fraud in the mortgage and subprime 
mortgage market, but did not pursue the investigation due to a lack of funding 
and staffing, after overall FBI staffing decreased between 2001 and 2007 and 
 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 5–7 (2009) (describing the economic effects and implications from the mortgage 
crisis).  The staggering losses from the mortgage crisis have spurred state attorneys general to action, 
indicting loan processors, mortgage brokers, and bank officers.  See David Segal, Financial Fraud 
Rises as Target for Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the Obama 
Administration‘s budget proposal ―includ[ed] money for more F.B.I. agents to investigate mortgage 
fraud and white-collar crime, and a 13 percent raise for the Securities and Exchange Commission‖). 
118. In cases where the defendants are convicted, large restitution orders offer little chance that 
victims will be compensated since the offenders have usually spent the money (first on luxuries, then 
on defense lawyers), lost their jobs, or hidden the assets prior to the judgment, and thus, have no real 
prospects of paying the money back.  Ross Todd, Three Cents on the Dollar, AM. LAW. & CORP. 
COUNS. (LITIGATION 2007: CORPORATE FRAUD), Fall 2007, at 68–69, 72. 
119. See Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern 
Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 294 (2007) (estimating that between 
1996 and 2005, 29.2% of firms engaged in manipulation of stock option grants to top executives).  
Backdating options raises critical accounting, disclosure, and tax issues.  After the waves of scandals 
from Tyco to Enron, the SEC began a probe over the pricing and timing of stock option grants in 
over 100 companies.  See Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard, Wall St. J. Online (Sept. 4, 2007), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html (listing companies 
that, as of September 2007, had come under scrutiny for stock options practices).  The SEC requires 
specific disclosures involving executive compensation and stock option grants.  SEC Reg. S-K, 
17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2010) (disclosure of the stock option expiration date is required by the SEC).  
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 now requires companies to report the granting of stock options 
within two business days of their issue, whereas previously the SEC allowed companies to report 
options within two months, which would allow executives to backdate (when stock prices were 
lower) the grant to inflate option pay.  Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); Adam 
Lashinsky, Why Options Backdating Is a Big Deal, CNNMoney.com (July 26, 2006), 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/26/magazines/fortune/lashinsky.fortune/index.htm.  Stock options 
backdating can be legal, but proper disclosure is necessary.  Id. 
120. Corporate Fraud: Options Cases, supra note 76 (reporting sixty-one pending options 
backdating cases); Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Matter of Timing: Five More Companies Show 
Questionable Options Pattern, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A1; Stephanie Saul, Study Finds 
Backdating of Options Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at C1 (reporting that backdating stock 
options scandal includes encompasses more than 2,000 companies); Eviatar, supra note 95, at 21. 
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resources were shifted to post-September 11, 2001, national security 
priorities.
121
  Even though the number of agents devoted to mortgage fraud 
has increased from 15 to 177 agents since 2004, the overall staffing level 
remains ―hundreds of agents below the levels seen in the 1980s during the 
savings and loan crisis.‖122  More recently, the securities fraud Ponzi scheme 
advanced by Bernie Madoff came to light in December 2008 only after 
Mr. Madoff told his sons of the crime.
123
  The U.S. House of Representatives 
Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises examined the Madoff scheme as a case 
study to assess whether the SEC requires reorganization.
124
  Given the failure 
of the SEC to exercise its civil enforcement authority, having a second avenue 
available in the criminal investigative and prosecutorial authority of a 
Corporate Crimes Division would have offered whistleblower Harry 
Markopolos two avenues of contact, and there would have been less 
likelihood that his complaints would be ignored.
125
  Early intervention would 
have stemmed years of Madoff-created losses.
126
 
By 1903, ―the growth of the [U.S.] economy and of corporate enterprise‖ 
made it ―evident‖ that the DOJ needed to ―have its own corps of specialists in 
antitrust law to cope with an increasingly complex enforcement situation.‖127  
 
121. See Lichtblau et al., supra note 113 (reporting that nearly one-third of agents were shifted 
to national security priorities after the September 11, 2001 attacks, while overall staffing at the FBI 
decreased by 132 agents between 2001 and 2007). 
122. Id. 
123. See Amir Efrati, Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at 
A1; Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov‘t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 10 
(2009) [hereinafter Hearing on Regulatory Failures] (statement of Harry Markopolos, Chartered 
Financial Analyst and Certified Fraud Examiner) (questioning by Rep. Scott Garrett, who asked, ―but 
for the statement by Mr. Madoff to his sons about what he had done, we may very well not be having 
this hearing today, that it would not have been uncovered officially at least.  Do you concur with that 
assessment?‖, to which Markopolos responded, ―Yes‖). 
124. See Hearing on Regulatory Failures, supra note 123, at 1 (statement of Rep. Paul E. 
Kanjorski, Chairman, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov‘t Sponsored Enters.). 
125. See id. at 5 (statement of Markopolos, a citizen whistleblower, that the case against 
Madoff was ―repeatedly ignored over an 8 1/2-year period between May 2000 and December 2008‖).  
Markopolos acknowledged in his testimony that he could have gone to the FBI, but believed his 
concerns would have been discounted by investigators once he informed them that he had already 
contacted the SEC on numerous occasions.  Id. at 25.   
126. See id. at 5 (statement of Markopolos, testifying that when he first approached the SEC 
with ―repeated and credible warnings‖ about the Madoff Ponzi scheme, the losses were likely 
between $3 billion and $7 billion, and yet the scheme was not stopped until losses had reach an 
estimated $50 billion); see also Efrati, supra note 123 (reporting that ―Madoff told his sons he 
believed losses from his fraud exceeded $50 billion‖). 
127. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL: ANTITRUST 
DIVISION (2010), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/atr.htm [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION 
FUNCTIONS MANUAL].  At the turn of the twentieth century, President Theodore Roosevelt was 
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Indeed, ―[c]orporate antitrust cases tend to be large and complicated, 
stretching across various jurisdictions and lasting an extended period of 
time.‖128  This Article posits that the growth of the world economy and the 
increasing complexity of corporate enterprise present the ripe opportunity to 
create a new DOJ division to address the persistent corporate criminality 
pervasive in our society. 
IV.  SUPERIOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: CORPORATE CRIMES  
DIVISION PROPOSAL 
A.  Defining Corporate Crime 
Edwin Sutherland, credited with coining the phrase ―white collar 
crime,‖129 defined it as a ―crime committed by a person of respectability and 
high social status in the course of his occupation.‖130  Sutherland studied the 
crimes of the seventy largest industrial and commercial corporations in the 
United States during the early twentieth century, and his research included 
both criminal convictions and civil judgments admitting or finding violations 
of the law.
131
  Sutherland‘s definition is but one of many meanings assigned to 
the phrase.
132
 
―Corporate crime‖ is a type of white-collar crime, and, as such, its 
definition can encompass a good deal of activity.
133
  Some noted categories of 
corporate crime include fraud, tax evasion, economic exploitation, antitrust 
activity, false advertising, theft, unfair labor practices, hazardous working 
conditions, violent torts, unsafe consumer products, and environmental 
offenses.
134
  John Braithwaite defines corporate crime as the ―conduct of a 
corporation, or of employees acting on behalf of a corporation, which is 
proscribed and punishable by law.‖135  Marshall Clinard has observed that 
 
locked in a battle to wrest control of the U.S. economy from the monopolistic practices of corporate 
trusts.  See FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 56.  In 1903, the President appointed an Assistant to the 
Attorney General to pursue antitrust crimes.  ANTITRUST DIVISION FUNCTIONS MANUAL, supra.  
This was the seed for the Antitrust Division, which was formally established in 1933.  Id.  
128. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 282.   
129. See Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 1 (1940). 
130. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (1983). 
131. See HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 2–3 (recounting Sutherland‘s study). 
132. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 372 n.72 (2003) (reviewing the various 
definitions given to ―white-collar crime‖).  
133. Corporate fraud is a subset of white-collar crime.  As an example, in February 2007, the 
FBI had over 18,000 pending white-collar crime cases, as compared to its 492 pending corporate 
fraud cases.  Corporate Fraud: Options Cases, supra note 76. 
134. See HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 21–31; CLINARD, supra note 20, at 14. 
135. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 6 (1984); 
see also SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 6–9 (2002) (assessing 
Braithwaite‘s definition of corporate crime). 
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corporations have been shielded from the stigma of the ―criminal‖ label by 
ensuring that a range of non-criminal punishments are available to address 
corporate wrongdoing, including ―administrative and civil penalties [such as] 
warnings, injunctions, consent orders, and non-criminal monetary 
payments.‖136  In fact, that list has grown in recent years to include non-
prosecution agreements (NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreements 
(DPAs).
137
  Consequently, Clinard asserts that administrative, civil, and 
criminal sanctions all should be considered in any definition of corporate 
crime.
138
  Recent malfeasance by corporate executives that appears to have 
benefitted them at the expense of corporate shareholders, but occurred subject 
to board or executive affirmation, suggests that a more refined definition as to 
what is included and what is not included may be in order.
139
  Thus, a 
 
136. See CLINARD, supra note 20, at 15. 
137. See U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL, supra note 46, at §§ 9-22.010 to 9-22.200 (describing 
pretrial diversion program); Finder & McConnell, supra note 48, at 1–3, 17–20; Ramirez, supra note 
47, at 951–53. 
138. CLINARD, supra note 20, at 15. 
139. The Model Penal Code (MPC) defines corporate crime in section 2.07(1), but the 
definition is limited in scope:  
(1) A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if: 
 (a) The offense is a violation or the offense as defined by a statute other 
than the Code in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on 
corporations plainly appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of the 
corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office 
or employment, except that if the law defining the offense designates the 
agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the 
circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; or  
 (b) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of 
affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or 
 (c) The commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, 
performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high 
managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his 
office or employment. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1).  The MPC includes the following definitions within § 2.07: 
(4) As used in this Section: 
 (a) ―corporation‖ does not include an entity organized as or by a 
governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program; 
 (b) ―agent‖ means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person 
authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or association and, in the case 
of an unincorporated association, a member of such association; 
 (c) ―high managerial agent‖ means an officer of a corporation or an 
unincorporated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any 
other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such 
responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy 
of the corporation or association. 
Id. § 2.07(4); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model 
Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593, 629–31 (1988) (reporting that many states that have 
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corporate official or employee commits a corporate crime if the official or 
employee violates the law in acting on behalf of the corporation, but if he or 
she gains personal benefit in the commission of a crime against the 
corporation without its knowledge or consent, as in the case of embezzlement 
of corporate funds, it is occupational crime and not corporate crime. 
In creating a Corporate Crimes Division, the scope of the division would 
be more narrowly defined, and would limit the types of corporate crime it 
pursues.  The DOJ already has divisions dedicated to addressing violations of 
antitrust, environmental, and tax laws.
140
  The unique feature of this division 
would be that unlike those divisions, which are defined by a narrow set of 
laws they are charged to enforce, this new division would combine purposes 
by looking to enforce certain groups of laws, but more significantly, focusing 
on the type of perpetrator.  The Criminal and Civil Divisions have broad legal 
responsibility for enforcing the laws of the United States.  The Corporate 
Crimes Division would focus on cases of fraud, especially financial crimes 
and fraud against the government, which would otherwise fall within the 
scope of these two divisions or the U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices across the United 
States.  The division would also consider the alleged perpetrator, and pursue 
activities by major corporate actors where the potential for harm is significant.  
In this format, the division might be better compared to the recently created 
National Security Division, which pursues violations concerning national 
security laws, but more significantly, pursues perpetrators who threaten 
national security.
141
 
Segregating corporate crime from other types of economic crimes is 
appropriate for many reasons.  The continued growth of corporate 
conglomerates that operate nationwide, or even multinationally, means that 
the effect of criminality is often multidistrict, at least.
142
  Pursuing such 
corporations through the Corporate Crimes Division would eliminate the 
territorial issues that arise when more than one federal district, and, therefore, 
more than one U.S. Attorney‘s Office, is involved.143  Additionally, the 
 
legislatively articulated corporate criminal liability appear to have patterned statutory language 
in some degree after the MPC, but most have not resorted to the limited version of corporate 
criminal liability articulated in MPC § 2.07). 
140. See U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL, supra note 46. 
141. See Mission and Functions, supra note 61. 
142. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL, supra note 46, at § 9-27.641 (Multi-District 
(Global) Agreement Requests) (click on ―Title 9,‖ then ―9-27.000,‖ followed by ―9-27.641‖). 
143. See, e.g., id. at § 9-44.160 (Health Care Fraud Investigations in Multiple Districts).  
Section 9-44.160(III) provides guidance on multidistrict litigation: 
When a federal or state investigative agency, a United States Attorney‘s Office 
or the Department of Justice ascertains that a subject is under investigation in 
multiple jurisdictions (whether by one or multiple agencies), they should 
convey that information to the relevant investigative agencies and the Criminal 
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complexity of multidistrict corporate structures requires greater expertise to 
investigate and analyze.
144
  Consequently, a Corporate Crimes Division that 
includes a variety of professionals would have at its disposal the expertise to 
sort through the organizational relationships of the megacorporation.  
Moreover, the complexity of the laws that govern corporate conduct, such as 
securities and banking laws, require legal and financial expertise that is often 
not available in the typical U.S. Attorney‘s Office.145  To the degree that a 
particular office does encounter a fair share of such litigation,
146
 those offices 
would still be encouraged to pursue such cases, but they would have the added 
benefit of the Corporate Crimes Division‘s experts to aid in investigating and 
preparing the case for trial.
147
 
 
and/or Civil Divisions of the Department of Justice and the appropriate United 
States Attorneys‘ Offices so that, where appropriate, they can develop together 
a nationwide strategy to most effectively coordinate the multiple efforts and 
efficiently use resources.  Where the subject operates only in one state or in one 
metropolitan area, communication to the relevant United States Attorneys is 
sufficient.  In other instances of multiple investigations of the same subject, the 
U.S. Attorney‘s Office must notify, as early as possible, the Criminal and/or 
Civil Divisions and relevant investigative agencies by letter or electronic mail 
of the multiple investigations and the following information:  
 A. The identity of the subjects of the investigation;  
 B. A summary of the factual allegations to be investigated; and  
 C. A preliminary assessment of the statutes which may have been violated. 
Id. 
144. See CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at 1.5–1.14; 
HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 67. 
145. Joan Neff Gurney, Factors Influencing the Decision to Prosecute Economic Crime, 
23 CRIMINOLOGY 609, 620 (1985). 
Organizations generate large volumes of paper and their financial records can 
be difficult to understand for those without adequate training in the 
fundamentals of accounting.  The [prosecutors] lack[] such training, and they 
also lack[] the resources to be able to afford the luxury of allowing a staff 
member to spend a large amount of time on any one case. 
Id. 
146. See CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at 1.5–1.14. 
147. See James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice‘s Centralization 
Efforts in Historical Context, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 219, 238–39 (2008). 
[T]he prosecution of criminal enterprises stretching across many states 
necessitated the formation of multidistrict prosecution teams.  The DOJ began 
to call conferences of First Assistant U.S. Attorneys and other supervisors in 
specialized areas (for example, terrorism and white-collar fraud). . . .  Some 
AUSAs acquire national reputations for expertise in their area, a development 
recognized by the DOJ when it draws upon experienced career assistants to 
make training videos and to teach seminars at the National Advocacy Institute.  
Assistants participating in training seminars at the National Advocacy Center 
inevitably become acquainted with those leading the seminars as well as with 
their fellow participants from other districts, and can seek advice and 
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The cost of corporate crime outweighs that of conventional crime many 
times over.
148
  The restriction on civil remedies in securities cases and other 
corporate fraud cases has created a void in oversight that is currently filled by 
resort to criminal prosecution.
149
  These restrictions limiting civil recourse and 
remedies have led directly to higher regulatory burdens for all businesses.
150
  
Alan Greenspan acknowledged that the flaw in the deregulatory actions of the 
last decade was the failure to account for the corporate agent‘s willingness to 
place short-term gain over the long-run self-interest of the corporation.
151
  
With corporate managers unable or unwilling to protect the long-range 
interest of the corporate entity,
152
 shareholders unable to hold corporate 
managers to their obligation to protect that interest,
153
 and professional 
gatekeepers such as accountants, analysts, and lawyers willing to sacrifice 
 
information from them . . . . 
Id.  Although Eisenstein argues that training at the National Advocacy Institute for Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys (AUSAs) has lessened the need for centralized authority through Main Justice, his 
observations about the value of training supports this proposal for a Corporate Crimes Division in 
that expertise in fighting corporate crime will be furthered with a division devoted to its cause, and 
those experts can aid in the training of AUSAs who work in districts across the United States. 
148. See Fletcher, supra note 4 (discussing the costs of corporate crime). 
149. See Hurt, supra note 100, at 389 (noting that empirical studies of post-Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) effects indicate that dismissal rates are much higher now 
(66.7% compared to 28.7% before the PSLRA), and that fewer meritorious cases are brought because 
of lower expected damages); Ramirez, supra note 47, at 969–70 (asserting that stiffer criminal 
penalties are necessary to compensate for lower rates of civil enforcement due to changes in law that 
lessen the likelihood of successful civil lawsuits against corporations to address corporate 
wrongdoing); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Politics and Corporate Crime Legislation, REGULATION, 
Spring 2004, at 30, 32 (observing that corporations would prefer criminal legislation, which imposes 
a higher burden of proof on the prosecution, over civil legislation, which entails greater private 
enforcement); Ramirez, supra note 15, at 1089–91 (arguing against relaxing private civil remedies 
for securities fraud in light of the rampant financial market fraud of the 1980s and 1990s). 
150. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 20, and 29 U.S.C.). 
151. See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov‘t Reform, 110th Cong. 33 (2008) (preliminary transcript) (statement of 
Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20081024163819.pdf (―I made a mistake in 
presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such . . . that 
they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.‖).  
152. See Ramirez, supra note 117, at 6 & nn.39–41 (―America‘s flawed system of corporate 
governance operated to allow CEOs to harvest huge compensation payments while offloading 
staggering risks upon their companies and the global economy generally.‖).  
153. See Hurt, supra note 100, at 380–89 (discussing the limits of private litigation avenues 
available to curb corporate misconduct); see also supra text accompanying note 149.  Professor Hurt 
observed that while ―corporate crimes may be harder to detect initially than some street crimes, 
which are more self-revealing, prosecutors have some effective investigatory and charging tools at 
their disposal to identify and confront individuals suspected of corporate crimes [that can] greatly 
increase the likelihood of a guilty plea or conviction.‖  Hurt, supra note 100, at 403. 
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reputational capital for generous consulting fees,
154
 affirmative measures to 
detect, investigate, and prosecute the criminal actions of corporations through 
their agents can be best accomplished by creating a division committed to that 
course. 
B.  The Proposal 
The Corporate Crimes Division would combine the resources and 
personnel from the Criminal Division Fraud Section that address, as part of 
that section‘s responsibilities, ―[i]nvestigating and prosecuting sophisticated 
and multidistrict white-collar crimes including corporate, securities, and 
investment fraud, government program and procurement fraud, and 
international criminal violations including the bribery of foreign government 
officials in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,‖155 with the 
expertise of various professionals and the investigative strengths of federal 
agencies responsible for regulating and overseeing corporations.  In addition 
to its focus on corporate crime litigation, the Corporate Crimes Division 
would also advise the Attorney General, Congress, and the White House on 
matters of corporate crime, develop legislative and policy proposals to 
enhance corporate crime fighting and to deter corporate criminality, 
coordinate corporate crime investigations and prosecutions across the DOJ, 
and develop and promote training and expertise in detecting, investigating, 
and prosecuting corporate crime. 
Each of the DOJ litigating divisions is divided into sections based, in part, 
upon expertise.  The Corporate Crimes Division would be constructed to limit 
its mission to corporate fraud in its many variations, but it might also be 
divided into litigating sections, such as the following: (1) a financial fraud 
section, including securities fraud, banking fraud, investment fraud, and 
accounting fraud;
156
 (2) a government procurement fraud section;
157
 (3) a 
 
154. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: ―It‘s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,‖ 57 
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405–08 (2002).  
155. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL: 
CRIMINAL DIVISION (2010), http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/crm.htm. 
156. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77aa (2006)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006)); Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 4, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680; 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006) (bank fraud); Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 18 U.S.C.). 
157. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (2006) (major fraud); Howard Cox, FASA and False 
Certifications: Procurement Fraud on the Information Superhighway, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 13–15 
(1995) (discussing the broad variety of federal laws used to criminally prosecute government 
procurement fraud).  
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health care fraud section;
158
 and (4) a foreign commerce section, addressing 
cases falling under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
159
  In addition to 
government enforcement through trial litigation, the Corporate Crimes 
Division would incorporate an appellate section that would draw cases from 
all the litigating sections, much like those sections in the Antitrust Division
160
 
or the Criminal Division.
161
  The division would also benefit from an 
economic and financial analysis section that would consolidate the expertise 
of financial experts, including forensic accountants, financial analysts, and 
economists.
162
 
Finally, the division would include a legislative policy and regulation 
section to advance the nonlitigating elements of its mission.
163
  This section 
would be responsible for developing division policy and advocating for 
regulatory policy consistent with law enforcement goals toward the corporate 
sector.  One benefit from this approach would be providing consistency in 
criminal prosecutions and in prosecution deferrals.  Critics have attacked the 
uneven application of the DOJ‘s corporate charging policies among the 
ninety-three U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices, including the use of DPAs and NPAs, 
and related issues such as appointment of monitors and waiver of attorney and 
work product privileges, even when such agreements are to be made available 
to prospective criminal defendants.
164
  Although relatively rare a mere decade 
 
158. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (conspiracy to defraud the government); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006 & Supp. 2008) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961–1968 (2006) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute); Stephen M. 
Blank et al., Health Care Fraud, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701 (2009); James G. Sheehan & Jesse A. 
Goldner, Beyond the Anti-Kickback Statute: New Entities, New Theories in Healthcare Fraud 
Prosecutions, 40 J. HEALTH L. 167, 171–72, 179–80 (2007) (discussing applicable laws in 
prosecuting corporations for health care fraud). 
159. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)–(h), 78dd(1)(3), 78ff (2006); International Anti-Bribery 
and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd(1)(3), 78ff (2006)). 
160. See United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Organization Chart, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/org.htm  (last visited July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Antitrust Division 
Organization Chart]. 
161. See Criminal Division Organization Chart, supra note 66. 
162. The DOJ Antitrust Division‘s Competition Policy, Economic Regulatory, and Economic 
Litigation Sections, for example, have on staff economists who work with litigators and form 
economic policy.  See United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division: Sections and Offices, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/sections.htm#ers (last visited July 16, 2010).   
163. See, e.g., United States Department of Justice, National Security Division, Law and Policy 
Office, http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/law.htm (last visited July 16, 2010); United States Department of 
Justice, Tax Division, About Us, http://www.justice.gov/tax/about_us.htm [hereinafter Tax Division, 
About Us] (last visited July 16, 2010); United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, 
Office of Policy and Legislation, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/about/opl.html (last visited July 16, 
2010). 
164. See, e.g., Finder & McConnell, supra note 48, at 1.  
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ago, these alternatives to full-scale criminal prosecution have mushroomed 
since Arthur Andersen‘s indictment,165 conviction,166 demise,167 and success 
on appeal.
168
  Because the DPA and NPA approaches benefit both the 
defendant and the government by lowering the risk to success posed by trial 
and appeal, decreasing litigation costs, and offering some control over the 
outcome, there is incentive to negotiate against criminal prosecution.
169
  
Furthermore, the government avoids the high burden of proof (beyond a 
reasonable doubt), and the corporation avoids the risk of collateral damage if 
convicted, such as debarment,
170
 or exposure to civil lawsuits riding the 
coattails of the criminal litigation.
171
 
Presently, corporate criminal fraud is one of many areas of concern in the 
Criminal Division of the DOJ.
172
  The Assistant Attorney General for the 
Criminal Division also has responsibility over diverse criminal sections, such 
as the gang unit, the capital case unit, the child exploitation and obscenity 
 
165. Arthur Andersen, formerly one of the major auditing firms, was criminally investigated 
for destroying Enron-related documents.  See generally Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations 
Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107 (2006).  
Arthur Andersen was charged with a single-count indictment for obstruction of justice, and was 
convicted by a federal jury in Houston, Texas.  Id.  Although the firm‘s conviction was affirmed by 
the Fifth Circuit, it was reversed and remanded by a unanimous Supreme Court.  Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005) (holding that the jury instructions failed to properly 
convey the elements of ―corrupt persuasion‖ for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)).   
166. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 698. 
167. It was the criminal indictment and not the conviction that sealed Arthur Andersen‘s fate.  
See Finder & McConnell, supra note 48, at 3. 
168. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 697 (unanimous decision); HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 
60–62; Ainslie, supra note 165, at 123.   
169. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 48, at 3; Ramirez, supra note 47, at 951–53 
(discussing the use and benefits of DPAs). 
170. See Ramirez, supra note 47, at 944 (identifying collateral consequences of corporate 
convictions, which may include ―debarment from government contracting, treble civil damages, 
shareholder derivative actions, [and] regulatory fines‖); id. at 949–51 (further describing the impact 
of debarment on a corporation, especially exclusion provisions known as the ―death penalty‖ in 
health care fraud cases); Kurt Eichenwald, HCA to Pay $95 Million in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
15, 2000, at C1 (reporting that ―[a]lthough the practices involve widespread criminal actions in 
HCA‘s hospital system, the guilty pleas will be formally entered by two inactive subsidiaries‖). 
171. See Ramirez, supra note 47, at 946 (―[C]ivil lawsuits based upon the underlying proven 
criminal conduct can be even more injurious because the standard of proof for establishing civil 
liability is lower than the ‗beyond a reasonable doubt‘ standard mandated in criminal prosecutions.‖) 
(citations omitted); Khanna, supra note 149, at 32 (observing that corporations would prefer criminal 
legislation to civil suits because there is greater private civil enforcement and higher criminal 
procedural standards).    
172. Carrie Johnson, Justice Department Putting New Focus on Combating Corporate Fraud, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2009, at A6 (noting that ―Justice Department and FBI officials [told] 
lawmakers that they are looking into more than 530 cases of alleged corporate malfeasance‖ and that 
FBI Deputy Director Pistole said the Bureau ―is ‗doing a complete scrub of all resources‘ to ensure 
that enough agents are assigned to corporate investigations‖).  
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section, the organized crime and racketeering section, and the narcotic and 
dangerous drug section, just to name a few.
173
  Given such broad authority and 
responsibility, it is not surprising that corporate crime is not given full 
attention until a pattern of criminality erupts into a crisis, such as the savings 
and loan crisis, the corporate accounting fraud crisis, or the more recent 
subprime mortgage crisis.
174
  Just as the Antitrust Division has had success in 
addressing anticompetitive practices among corporations, and the 
Environment and Natural Resources Division has pursued environmental 
crimes,
175
 the Corporate Crimes Division would likely enjoy similar success.  
Led by the policy and regulation section, the Corporate Crimes Division could 
anticipate risks of corporate criminality and promote legislative stopgaps, or 
at the very least, could recognize patterns of corporate criminality at an early 
stage and prosecute the criminal trailblazers.  Through earlier prosecution, the 
division could deliver a message of deterrence to those who might follow, 
rather than wait until wrongdoing reached a crisis stage and then lobby 
Congress and the White House for additional resources.
176
  Early intervention 
and pursuit of criminal conduct would reduce the social harm by protecting 
the American business sector‘s reputation177 and avoid risking vast sums of 
American taxpayer dollars in another bailout.
178
 
 
173. See Criminal Division Organization Chart, supra note 66. 
174. See Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and 
Consequences, FDIC BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 26, 33, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf (describing the Savings and 
Loans Crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, which resulted at that time in the greatest collapse of financial 
institutions to occur since the Great Depression and cost taxpayers an estimated $124 billion to 
resolve); supra text accompanying notes 100 (Enron) and 117 (subprime mortgage crisis).    
175. See Russell Mokhiber, Top 100 Corporate Criminals of the Decade, Corporate Crime 
Reporter (n.d.), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/top100.html (listing the top 100 companies 
by size of criminal fine imposed during the 1990s).  Six out of the top ten fines were for antitrust 
crimes, as were twenty of the top one hundred.  Id.  Thirty-eight of the top one hundred fines were 
for environmental crimes.  Id.  Thus, pursuit of antitrust and environmental crimes together 
accounted for nearly three-fifths of the top one hundred criminal fines levied against corporations.  
See id. 
176. See, e.g., Lichtblau et al., supra note 113 (describing how the FBI‘s warnings of the 
mortgage fraud crisis as early as 2004 went unheeded and how its requests for additional resources 
were ignored). 
177. See Ramirez, supra note 47, at 994–95.  ―Foreign investor confidence in U.S. businesses is 
influenced by the perception of the integrity of U.S. financial markets.  Thus, confidence in U.S. 
businesses can lower the cost of capital by reducing interest rates, which is beneficial to all U.S. 
investors.‖  Id. at 1000.  
178. See, e.g., Mark Pittman & Bob Ivry, Financial Rescue Nears GDP as Pledges Top 
$12.8 Trillion, Bloomberg.com (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601087&sid=armOzfkwtCA4 (―The U.S. government and the Federal Reserve have 
spent, lent or committed $12.8 trillion, an amount that approaches the value of everything produced 
in the country last year, to stem the longest recession since the 1930s.‖).   
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Given the complexity of corporate crime, the need to continue to 
coordinate interagency efforts with investigating agencies is critical to 
successful investigations and prosecutions.
179
  The Corporate Crimes Division 
would retain the task forces described above, and replace the current 
chairpersons with the Assistant Attorney General of the Corporate Crimes 
Division, or the appropriate Assistant or Deputy Attorney General of the 
particular related litigating section.  Presently, members of the Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force include senior officials of the Department of 
the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of 
Education, the Department of Homeland Security, the SEC, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Small 
Business Administration, the FBI, the Social Security Administration, the 
Internal Revenue Service (Criminal Investigations), the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the U.S. Secret 
Service, and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, among 
others.
180
  This task force represents ―the talents and experience of thousands 
of investigators, attorneys, accountants, and regulatory experts.‖181  With a 
Corporate Crimes Division in place, the goal would be to further develop the 
relationships among these agencies, not just at the managerial level, but more 
deeply within the organizations, and potentially even drawing some experts 
from the agencies into the Corporate Crimes Division litigating sections as 
 
179. See Johan A. de Bruijn & Ernst F. ten Heuvelhof, Policy Networks & Governance, in 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 161, 162, 173–75 (David L. Weimer ed., 1995) (addressing strategic 
concepts of network management and network restructuring).  The authors observe: 
Creating stability and points of reference in a network is considered . . . a[n] 
important aspect of network management.  One approach to reducing instability 
and the uncertainty it produces is for organizations to develop more credible 
relations by sharing members.  These members, as in interlocking directorates, 
can convey reliable information between organizations to facilitate 
coordination.   
Id. at 174 (citations omitted).  The task forces can approximate in government the interlocking 
network management for investigative and prosecutorial offices and divisions within and outside of 
the DOJ.  In maximizing use of task forces, however, the participants must perceive that there is a 
―net benefit‖ in information sharing, providing a ―cooperative surplus‖ for each agency or office, 
perhaps in the form of recognition for its contribution to any subsequent convictions.  See id. at 175. 
180. See Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123 (Nov. 17, 2009). 
181. See, e.g., CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE 2008 REPORT, supra note 58, at iii. 
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permanent members of the Corporate Crimes Division.
182
  In addition to the 
permanent employees of the Corporate Crimes Division, agencies such as the 
SEC and the DOJ could implement cross-designations, so that an SEC 
attorney or investigator could cross into the division temporarily to aid in an 
ongoing case or set of cases. 
Some experts would be permanently associated with a particular litigating 
section, as distinguished from temporarily being assigned to the economic and 
financial analysis section.  Thus, securities investigators would be hired as 
part of the financial fraud section,
183
 for example, which would also include 
financial analysts and economists, engineers or logisticians would be hired as 
part of the procurement fraud section,
184
 and nurses or other medical experts 
would be hired as part of the health care fraud section.  Dedicated 
professionals and investigators within the division could ease the burden on 
the FBI and provide institutional consistency.  Some experts, such as forensic 
accountants, would be available on a broader scale throughout the Corporate 
Crimes Division, and would be assigned to the economic and financial 
analysis section,
185
 where their expertise may be as useful in uncovering 
investment fraud as it would be in uncovering health care fraud.
186
 
One critical feature of this proposal is that U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices 
throughout the country would retain local authority to prosecute corporate 
crime.  As was discussed above, several of the offices, especially those in 
major metropolitan areas with active financial centers, have seen essential 
corporate crime fighting success.
187
  Those offices may already have separate 
 
182. See de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, supra note 179, at 175 (―Network management can be 
viewed as the reworking of relations in such a way that the goals of individual actors and those of the 
governing actor are sufficiently congruent to offer mutual benefits from cooperation.‖). 
183. See, e.g., Hearing on Regulatory Failures, supra note 123, at 33–34 (statement of Harry 
Markopolos) (recommending that the SEC hire a variety of financial professionals to improve its 
investigatory operations). 
184. See NATIONAL PROCUREMENT FRAUD TASK FORCE PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 58, at 
34 (noting that the task force is creating an expert witness directory to identify ―individuals with 
expertise in subjects relevant to procurement fraud prosecution‖).  
185. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 162.  
186. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors‘ and Officers‘ 
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 770 (2009) (describing the use of 
forensic accountants and Wall Street research analysts by plaintiff securities firms to review financial 
documents of a corporation to determine whether to file a claim and to unearth facts to support the 
claim). 
187. See supra text accompanying note 115.  U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices may continue to pursue 
cases, especially larger offices with sections dedicated to securities fraud or corporate crime, such as 
the Northern District of California (San Francisco), which has a Securities Fraud Section and a White 
Collar Crime Section as part of its Criminal Division, or the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Philadelphia), which has a Financial Institution Fraud Section and a Government and Health Care 
Fraud Section as part of its Criminal Division.  See United States Department of Justice, United 
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financial fraud units operating within the larger U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices, and, 
even if no separate section is devoted to corporate crime, many offices retain 
experienced litigators who are assets to the DOJ and have been highly 
successful in litigating these types of cases in the past.
188
  If a Corporate 
Crimes Division were adopted, some of these litigators may wish to transfer 
into the division and provide foundational expertise to its operation.  These 
lawyers could also contribute to the division‘s mission through their 
participation in training new lawyers and in updated training through the 
National Advocacy Institute.  As described above, one responsibility of the 
new division would be promoting and developing training in the detection, 
investigation, and prosecution of corporate crime.  Retaining authority within 
the local offices would also contribute to the improved institutional design 
because it would allow for both centralized direction and oversight by the 
division, as well as creativity and localized cultural understanding by the U.S. 
Attorneys‘ Offices.189 
Moreover, retention of litigating authority with local U.S. Attorneys‘ 
Offices would advance the key feature of the Corporate Crimes Division—
using the division to pursue large-scale corporate criminality, either because 
of the size of the corporation, the scope of the fraud, or the multidistrict extent 
of the fraudulent activity.  Corporate fraud cases are time-consuming to 
investigate and costly to prosecute, relative to other criminal and civil 
matters.
190
  One study of local prosecutors concluded that ―[t]he evidence 
suggests that whenever economic crime units . . . have been established as a 
device for more effectively prosecuting white-collar crime, the units place 
protecting the property interests of corporations and other organizations ahead 
of protecting individual citizens from corporate wrongdoing.‖191  Because of 
 
States Attorney‘s Office: Eastern District of Pennsylvania, About the Office, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/about.html (last visited July 16, 2010). 
188. See, e.g., supra note 187. 
189. See Eisenstein, supra note 147, at 223–26 (recounting the arguments supporting 
decentralized organization in the DOJ that promotes local U.S. Attorney‘s Office autonomy).  
Among arguments supporting local autonomy is the recognition that local prosecutors have a more 
―intimate understanding‖ of the local community, including its leaders, its diversity, and the impact 
of these factors on case selection (such as the attitudes of potential jurors to particular crimes), as 
well as a clearer picture on the full scope of pending litigation in the district.  Id.  
190. See MICHAEL L. BENSON & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, COMBATING CORPORATE CRIME 66 
(1998) (―Because corporate crimes are committed in organizational settings, they can be troublesome 
to detect, investigate, and prosecute. . . .  Prevailing in such complicated cases is difficult even for 
experienced, well-funded federal prosecutors.‖) (citations omitted); Brown, supra note 97, at 527–28 
(discussing the difficulty in detection of criminal activity, the complexity of financial records, and 
the comparatively overwhelming resources of corporate conglomerates as compared to government 
resources to fight corporate crime).  
191. FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 278; see Gurney, supra note 145, at 622–23; Joan Neff 
Gurney, Implementing a National Crime Control Program—The Case of an Economic Crime Unit, in 
IMPLEMENTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES 33, 43–45 (Merry Morash ed., 1982). 
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the resource demands of corporate fraud prosecutions, U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices 
are most likely to pursue only low-hanging fruit, that is, the cases that are 
easier to investigate and prosecute.
192
  Restructuring the DOJ‘s approach to 
corporate fraud cases would not eliminate authority of the U.S. Attorneys‘ 
Offices to pursue such cases, and indeed, some offices would likely continue 
to vigorously pursue larger cases, especially where local corporations are 
involved. 
On the other hand, prosecuting such cases through the Corporate Crimes 
Division would offer several advantages, depending upon the circumstances.  
First, in instances where the suspected activity is occurring in a particularly 
large corporation or spanning multiple judicial districts, the division could 
step in with the expertise and resources available to it without draining 
resources away from the local U.S. Attorney‘s Office.  Second, decisions 
regarding the investigation and prosecution of a corporation, made by a 
regionally based office or the division headquarters, could minimize any 
political influence that might interfere when district offices pursue local 
businesses, and threaten local jobs or risk political careers.
193
  Third, many 
prosecutors eventually leave government service and go into private practice, 
and, therefore, depend on local businesses as future clients or sources of 
income.
194
  A Corporate Crimes Division would be exempt from local 
pressures in assessing whether to investigate and prosecute a case against an 
influential major corporation. 
The operational headquarters for the Corporate Crimes Division would 
presumably be centralized in Washington, D.C., like the other DOJ 
divisions.
195
  Such a centralized location would permit ease of exchange of 
 
192. See Gurney, supra note 145, at 619.  In her study of a local county economic crimes unit, 
Gurney observed that ―[t]he pressure to produce convictions coupled with limited resources produced 
a situation conducive to selecting cases for prosecution which could be prepared for trial quickly and 
easily and which had a strong probability of success.‖  Id.  In a study of local prosecution of 
corporate crime, over half of the respondents indicated that ―insufficient investigative or 
prosecutorial personnel ‗definitely‘ or ‗probably‘ would limit their willingness to prosecute.‖  
BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 190, at 79. 
193. See supra text accompanying notes 191–92. 
194. See FRIEDRICHS, supra note 10, at 278.  To address retention issues, the DOJ Tax Division 
requires all new attorney hires to serve four continuous years with the division.  United States 
Department of Justice, Tax Division, Working for Us: Attorneys, 
http://www.justice.gov/tax/career_atty.htm (last visited July 16, 2010).  This retention policy is not 
part of the Corporate Crimes Division proposal. 
195. See United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Contact Information, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/contact.html [hereinafter Antitrust Division, Contact Information] (last 
visited July 16, 2010); United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Contact the Criminal 
Division, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/about/contact.html (last visited July 16, 2010); United 
States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Civil Division FOIA, 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/foia.html (last visited July 16, 2010); United States Department of 
Justice, Civil Rights Division, Office of the Assistant Attorney General, 
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ideas and encourage cooperation with other divisions and agencies 
headquartered in Washington, D.C.  Additionally, regional offices (also 
known as ―field offices‖) could be established, just as they are for the 
Antitrust Division.
196
  Field offices are given primary responsibility for cases 
arising out of assigned regions.  For example, the Antitrust Division‘s 
Chicago Field Office is assigned a region that includes all or part of twelve 
Midwest and Plains states.
197
  In selecting cities for regional office locations, 
one could choose major financial centers (recognizing that the local U.S. 
Attorney‘s Office likely already will have expertise and that there may be 
overlap in coverage), or one could choose centrally located metropolitan areas 
with efficient transportation systems affording easy access to the entire 
region. 
C.  Corporate Fraud Division Versus Corporate Crimes Division 
The proposal described above contemplates a division focused on criminal 
investigation and enforcement.  One possible variant on this proposal, 
however, is to create a Corporate Fraud Division rather than a Corporate 
Crimes Division to incorporate the possibility of utilizing the expertise of the 
division to pursue corporate offenses that do not rise to the level of a criminal 
violation.  Other DOJ litigating divisions, such as the Tax Division
198
 and the 
Environment and Natural Resources Division,
199
 include both criminal and 
civil litigation sections.  Several issues would arise in extending the division‘s 
reach to include civil enforcement.  First, there is the potential overlap of 
authority with other administrative agencies on the civil cases.
200
  Second, 
 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/ofcaag.php (last visited July 16, 2010); United States Department of 
Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Contact ENRD, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/ENRD_Contact.html (last visited July 16, 2010); United States 
Department of Justice, Tax Division, Freedom of Information Act, 
http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/foia/foia1.htm (last visited July 16, 2010). 
196. The Antitrust Division has eight regional offices located across the United States to pursue 
criminal investigations and prosecutions; they are located in Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, 
New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.  See Antitrust Division Organization 
Chart, supra note 160. 
197. The Chicago Field Office covers the following territory: Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Western District of Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
and Wisconsin.  Antitrust Division, Contact Information, supra note 195. 
198. See Tax Division, About Us, supra note 163. 
199. See United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, 
About ENRD, http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/About_ENRD.html (last visited July 16, 2010). 
200. This might be true especially in securities cases where the SEC is authorized to bring 
enforcement actions.  See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006); 17 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2010). 
When an SEC investigation uncovers potential securities violations, the 
violation usually is handled through administrative procedures set forth in the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  The Commission may issue subpoenas, formal 
orders of investigation, or other means necessary to enforce the federal 
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there is the likelihood of parallel investigations since many corporations 
violate both civil and criminal laws.
201
 
Early in an investigation, the question of whether conduct violates both 
criminal and civil laws may not be obvious.  The Corporate Crimes Division 
would be responsible for investigating corporations, but since a corporation 
can act only through its agents,
202
 individuals would also be subject to 
prosecution by the division.  If, instead, a Corporate Fraud Division was 
created to include a civil enforcement section, care would have to be taken to 
follow DOJ procedures regarding parallel investigations and to protect the 
constitutional rights afforded individuals in criminal proceedings.
203
  Parallel 
proceedings raise the specter of constitutional disputes arising out of the 
additional constitutional protections afforded to a criminal defendant, and 
 
securities laws or to investigate any form of non-compliance with the securities 
laws. 
PAMELA H. BUCY, WHITE COLLAR PRACTICE 331 (3d ed. 2005) (citation omitted).  Most criminal 
cases begin with the SEC‘s initial investigation using its broad subpoena powers; once the SEC 
determines a violation was committed ―willfully,‖ it may recommend the case for prosecution to the 
DOJ.  Id. 
201. The SEC and DOJ rely on parallel civil and criminal proceedings (concurrent 
investigations) of the same conduct as an efficient means of law enforcement.  JULIE R. 
O‘SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1008–20 (2001); Joseph F. Savage Jr. & Robert J. 
Durbin, Government Use of Civil & Criminal Proceedings: Any Limits?, ANDREWS LITIG. REP. 
(WHITE-COLLAR CRIME), Dec. 2005, at 1, 3.  The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 permit the SEC to share with the DOJ any information it obtains in an 
investigation through civil discovery.  Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006) 
(providing that whenever it appears to the SEC that a violation of the Act has occurred, the SEC may 
―transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney 
General who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this 
subchapter‖); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2006).  The SEC 
retains authority to continue its civil investigation of securities law violations after making a 
recommendation of criminal prosecution to the DOJ.  Mikah K. Story Thompson, To Speak or Not to 
Speak? Navigating the Treacherous Waters of Parallel Investigations Following the Amendment of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 939, 952–53 (2008); see also Press Release, U.S. 
Dep‘t of Justice, Quest Diagnostics to Pay U.S. $302 Million to Resolve Allegations that a 
Subsidiary Sold Misbranded Test Kits (Apr. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-civ-350.html (announcing global settlement of civil and 
criminal charges, with a subsidiary pleading guilty) [hereinafter Press Release, Quest Diagnostics]. 
202. 1 BRICKEY, supra note 36, §§ 3:01–3:11, at 89–126 (describing the theories by which 
corporate criminal liability may be imputed through the acts of a corporation‘s agents). 
203. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal 
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1325, 1325, 1389–92 (1991); Anthony A. Joseph & R. Marcus Givhan, The New Litigative 
Environment: Defending a Client in Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, ALA. LAW., Jan. 1999, 
at 48 (discussing false claim lawsuits, media reports, audits, complaints obtained from governmental 
hotlines, congressional inquiries, tips or complaints from competitors, and interviews with a 
corporation‘s employees).  If the government has not initiated a civil proceeding in ―bad faith‖ to 
obtain evidence solely for the use in a criminal proceeding, parallel investigations are constitutionally 
permissible.  United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970); United States v. Tison, 780 F.2d 
1569, 1573 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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involve different rules of procedure.
204
  Potential issues created by parallel 
proceedings include protecting a defendant‘s Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination, threats to a defendant‘s due process rights because of the 
more generous civil discovery provisions, and undermining a defendant‘s 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel through use of civil 
discovery that can lead to production of documents in civil litigation that 
would be harmful to the defendant‘s interests in criminal litigation.205  
Furthermore, ethical issues and charges of prosecutorial misconduct might 
arise through defendant claims of unfair pressure by the prosecution to 
negotiate a civil settlement unfavorable to the defendant-corporation so that 
the defendant might avoid the significant collateral consequences that might 
accompany a criminal prosecution.
206
 
A critical feature to put in place if the division were structured to address 
both criminal and civil investigations would be to have two Deputy Assistant 
Attorney Generals—one to head the criminal enforcement sections and the 
other to oversee the civil enforcement sections.
207
  The civil side could 
duplicate the specialty litigating sections, including a financial fraud section, 
government procurement fraud section, health care fraud section, and foreign 
commerce section.  In contrast, the appellate section, the legislative policy and 
regulation section, and the economic and financial analysis section would 
serve the entire division in providing expertise, training, and consistency in 
policy application. 
D.  Challenges to Creating a Corporate Crimes Division 
The National Security Division of the DOJ was established on 
September 28, 2006, to protect ―America against international and domestic 
terrorism and other national security threats.‖208  This was ―the first new 
Department of Justice division in almost 50 years.‖209  The division‘s 
 
204. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 
205. See Cheh, supra note 203, at 1325, 1389–92.  
206. See Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 
IND. L.J. 411, 415 (2007) (arguing that settlements after Enron suggest that even a powerful 
corporation will ―cave under pressure to settle to avoid an indictment, even an unjust one‖); Sharon 
Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions, Corporate 
Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 625, 666 
(2007) (discussing the pressure on corporations to agree to civil settlements to avoid greater criminal 
liability). 
207. See infra Appendix. 
208. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, NAT‘L SEC. DIV., PROGRESS REPORT, at i (2008) [hereinafter 
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION PROGRESS REPORT].  See USA Patriot Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 506(b)(1), 120 Stat. 192, 248–49 (2006) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 509A(b) (2006)) (authorizing creation of the National Security Division). 
209. NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 208, at i.  The DOJ Civil 
Rights Division was created in 1957.  Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634; see 
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objectives were to centralize management, break down barriers between 
agencies, and coordinate efforts within the DOJ and the federal, state, and 
local governments to ―enhance our ability to defend against terrorism.‖210  Just 
as the National Security Division was created to address the pressing issue of 
terrorism, the Civil Rights Division was established on the heels of the 
landmark United States Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of 
Education,
211
 which overturned the ―separate but equal‖ doctrine, and the 
Antitrust Division was formed to enforce the Sherman Act and break up the 
monopoly power of powerful trusts during the Progressive Era.
212
  The time 
has come to once again call together the forces of the DOJ to face off against 
a powerful challenge to the security of the United States.  Creating a 
Corporate Crimes Division has logical support in the consolidation of 
resources and expertise, as well as in addressing a scourge that is costing 
American taxpayers billions of dollars and American businesses untold value 
in reputation.  Yet, there are some potential challenges to its creation that 
must be considered, including the risks inherent in consolidating 
governmental power, the potential backlash to the disruption of the status quo, 
and the probable lack of support from powerful corporate interests that may 
have the most to lose from a concerted effort to address corporate criminality. 
Promoting a division dedicated to the pursuit of addressing corporate 
crime consolidates power that is presently spread among several DOJ 
divisions and throughout the nation‘s U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices.  The primary 
risk in consolidating power is that it simplifies the opportunity to abuse power 
more directly.
213
  Although the U.S. Attorney General, the top deputies, and 
the U.S. Attorneys in each district are political appointees, the DOJ is staffed 
with attorneys whose tenure spans administrations, and the DOJ has had a 
history of nonpartisanship in the exercise of prosecutorial decision making.
214
  
However, the U.S. Attorney scandal that began in December 2006 and erupted 
in January 2007 is evidence that abuse of discretion is possible even within 
 
Office of the Attorney Gen., Order Establishing Civil Rights Division in DOJ, 22 Fed. Reg. 10,310 
(Dec. 9, 1957); Drew S. Days, III, Vindicating Civil Rights in Changing Times, 93 YALE L.J. 990, 
990–91 (1984). 
210. NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 208, at 1.  
211. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
212. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); supra text accompanying notes 42–43. 
213. See Eisenstein, supra note 147, at 222–23; John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice 
Department: An Eyewitness Account, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265, 276–79 (2008).  
214. See McKay, supra note 213, at 279–80; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) 
(observing that the U.S. Attorney ―may strike hard blows, [but] he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction 
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one‖). 
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the halls of Justice.
215
  The restructuring proposed here would place primary 
authority for setting policy and seeking resources within the hands of a few, 
and with fewer persons making decisions regarding prosecutions, there is 
more opportunity for capture and the potential to thereby limit prosecutions 
overall.
216
  Moreover, although the U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices would retain 
authority to pursue corporate crimes, one can envision an inability for such 
offices to garner more resources in that quest if there is a division that is 
primarily accountable for such prosecutions.  Central authority could limit the 
effectiveness of the pursuit of corporate criminality in any number of ways, 
short of refusing cases.  Some possibilities would be to create policies to 
almost exclusively pursue NPAs or DPAs, to narrow the scope of the cases by 
size of corporation or size of loss to exclude many potential defendants, to 
 
215. See U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. 
ATTORNEYS IN 2006, at 356–58 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/ 
s0809a/final.pdf.  The report concludes that questionable circumstances surrounded the removal of 
three U.S. Attorneys.  Id. at 331–36.  See also McKay, supra note 213, at 265, 274–75.   
216. Capture occurs when an agency, though created for the public‘s interest, actually works in 
favor of the parties the agency was designed to regulate.  See Joel A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured 
the EPA?: Appraising Marver Bernstein‘s Captive Agency Theory After Fifty Years, 17 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing how the ―captive agency theory‖ conceptualized by Bernstein 
still has viability today in explaining the behavior of federal regulatory agencies in the twenty-first 
century); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 29 (1971); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., 
A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715, 725–26 (1986).  In the face 
of the Bernie Madoff scandal, the SEC was accused of being a captive agency that ―roar[s] like a 
mouse and bite[s] like a flea.‖  See Hearing on Regulatory Failures, supra note 123, at 8. 
Capture is the result of lobbying, corporate consolidation, and a revolving door in which 
regulators ultimately work for the businesses they regulate.  See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, 
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 3–4 (1955).  A recent example would be 
former Treasury Secretary Henry (Hank) Paulson, who worked in the Pentagon from 1970 to 1972, 
joined Goldman Sachs in 1974, and rose to chairman and CEO of the company.  See Landon 
Thomas, Jr., Paulson Comes Full Circle: Bush Picks a Deficit Hawk with White House Experience, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at C1 (recounting Paulson‘s career both in and out of the government, his 
thirty-two years at Goldman (those who know him say he ―bleeds Goldman blue‖), and Goldman‘s 
historical commitment to public service with many partners pursuing careers in Washington); 
Goldman Gives Ex-Chief $18.7 Million Bonus, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2006, at C2.  While in that 
position, he was tapped by the George W. Bush Administration to be Treasury Secretary in 2006, and 
was a principal architect of the bailout programs in late 2008 and early 2009.  See Jenny Anderson, 
Goldman Chairman Gets a Bonus of $53.4 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006, at C2 (reporting that 
the new Goldman Sachs bonus came as a result of record profit at Goldman Sachs six months after 
its former chairman and CEO, Henry Paulson, was selected as Treasury Secretary).  When AIG 
released the list of beneficiaries from the federal bailout money it received, Goldman Sachs was at 
the top of the list, receiving $12.9 billion in payments owed from AIG. Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. 
Lists Firms to Which it Paid Taxpayer Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, at A1; William D. Cohan, 
Big Profits, Big Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, at A27.  Only a year after a government 
bailout, Goldman Sachs continues to emerge from the financial crisis in strong shape, gaining market 
share from former rivals such as Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, taking on additional risk, and 
earning record second-quarter profits in 2009 that surpassed its earnings for all of 2008.  Susanne 
Craig & Aaron Lucchetti, Goldman Gains on Rivals‘ Pain, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2009, at A1. 
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limit funding for the division
217
 or investigators to pursue leads,
218
 or to 
impose more administrative burdens upon the line attorneys recommending 
prosecution that would be encountered within the U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices.219  
Although the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force and the U.S. 
Attorneys‘ Offices can act as a check on the power of the division,220 this risk 
persists, more or less depending upon the Administration‘s support for 
vigorous prosecution of corporate criminality.
221
  The power to abuse is 
already present in the current institutional structure, primarily through 
deprivation of resources;
222
 however, centralizing authority within a DOJ 
division slightly enhances that risk. 
Nevertheless, centralizing responsibility by implementing a Corporate 
Crimes Division would provide the benefit of enhanced transparency in 
assessing the level of support for corporate crime fighting.  The current 
structure makes it impossible to assess what resources are dedicated to 
 
217. A study of cases brought by the Antitrust Division from 1955 to 1994 determined that an 
increase in the DOJ‘s budget allocation to the division had a ―strong positive impact on the number 
of cases initiated‖ by the division.  See Vivek Ghosal & Joseph Gallo, The Cyclical Behavior of the 
Department of Justice‘s Antitrust Enforcement Activity, 19 INT‘L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 27, 27–48 
(2001).  In reaching this conclusion, the study specifically considered and refuted the possibility that 
funding followed increases in case activity.  Id. at 42, 48. 
218. For example, the FBI shifted investigators from white-collar criminal investigations to 
address national security issues after September 11, 2001.  See Lichtblau et al., supra note 113 (loss 
of 625 agents, or 36% of its 2001 levels of staffing for white-collar crime investigations).  Despite 
pleas for more money and bodies to address rise in corporate crime, those requests were ignored by 
the Bush Administration.  Id.  In 2003 and 2004, the FBI began requesting more money to investigate 
financial fraud in housing markets, but was rebuffed by the Justice Department and the Office of 
Management and Budget.  Id.  Overall, the agency lost 132 agents from 2001 to 2007, despite 
requests for an increase of more than 1,100 agents, and had only 15 full-time agents devoted to 
mortgage fraud.  Id. 
219. For example, for indictments the Antitrust Division has a policy that requires staff to 
create case recommendation memoranda that can be lengthy, thereby causing delays for prosecution.  
U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL: INVESTIGATION AND CASE DEVELOPMENT 
III-119 (4th ed. 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter3.pdf.  
―The case recommendation package submitted by staff should typically consist of the case 
recommendation memoranda, draft pleadings, a proposed press release (where applicable), and any 
other documents deemed most relevant to a full consideration of the case, including its critical and 
contested elements, and its strengths and weaknesses.‖  Id.  ―Staff‘s case recommendation 
memorandum should generally not exceed thirty (30) pages, except in appropriate circumstances 
(e.g., multi-count, multi-defendant indictments) . . . .‖  Id. at III-125.  Of course, a thorough case 
recommendation analysis has the benefit of anticipating and critically analyzing potential pitfalls in 
the case and thereby may result in stronger cases.  Id. at III-119 to III-120. 
220. See Eisenstein, supra note 147, at 226. 
221. In ignoring pleas for more resources to combat fraud, the White House and the Treasury 
Department indicated, ironically, to the DOJ and the FBI that the agencies were taking an 
―antibusiness attitude‖ that could chill corporate risk-taking.  See Lichtblau et al., supra note 113. 
222. See id.; supra text accompanying note 217 (discussing the impact of financial resources on 
the success of the Antitrust Division). 
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fighting corporate crime.
223
  Thus, if an administration chooses to decrease 
enforcement measures against corporations, it is difficult to sort through 
budgets of the various divisions, litigating sections, U.S. Attorneys‘ Offices, 
task forces, and investigative agencies to identify committed resources.  While 
creating a new division would leave many of these participants in place, 
having a centralized body accountable to the DOJ, the White House, 
Congress, and the American people would incentivize the administrators of 
the division to demonstrate the effectiveness of its efforts.
224
  Thus, a full 
accounting still may not be available, but a critical measurement could be 
taken.  Finally, in addition to federal resources expended to pursue corporate 
crime, state attorneys general also remain available to pursue such crimes and 
have been a force in addressing corporate fraud locally.
225
  Action by state 
attorneys general may call attention to lack of federal activity and spur federal 
investigations and prosecutions.
226
 
Another challenge to implementing a Corporate Crimes Division could be 
internal resistance to institutional reform.  The movement of certain litigating 
sections into the Corporate Crimes Division could meet resistance from within 
the Criminal Division (and the Civil Division, if a Corporate Fraud Division is 
pursued).  Although the corporate fraud cases are only a fraction of the overall 
responsibilities for those divisions, and although major fraud cases often 
consume a disproportionate share of resources on a per case basis, successful 
negotiation of a plea or settlement can lead to large fines.
227
  These fines, 
when averaged with the other cases pursued by these divisions, can enhance 
 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95 (discussing the difficulty in counting cases). 
224. See Philip Pettit, Institutional Design and Rational Choice, in THE THEORY OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 54, 60–61 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996) (observing that ―[u]nder ideal 
institutional design, . . . a suitable pattern of screens and sanctions‖ should be developed ―to promote 
a procedurally conscientious and public-spirited performance‖ on the part of public agents). 
225. See, e.g., Segal, supra note 117 (reporting on the efforts of state attorneys general to 
prosecute loan processors, mortgage brokers, and bank officers embroiled in the subprime mortgage 
crisis). 
226. See id. 
227. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Novo Nordisk Agrees to Pay $9 Million Fine in 
Connection with Payment of $1.4 Million in Kickbacks Through the United Nations Oil-for-Food 
Program (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/09-crm-461.html; 
Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Former Head Securities Trader for Lancer Group Hedge Funds 
Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Mail, Wire and Securities Fraud (Apr. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-crm-405.html (announcing guilty plea to complex 
scheme to defraud involving conspiracy to manipulate securities trading through shell corporations); 
Press Release, Quest Diagnostics, supra note 201; Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, GSA 
Contractor NetApp Agrees to Pay U.S. $128 Million to Resolve Contract Fraud Allegations (Apr. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-civ-353.html. 
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the statistics for the division.
228
  Moreover, even though the attention to 
corporate fraud can be easily shifted by national crisis, such as the shift of 
resources to fight terrorism after the September 11, 2001 attacks, netting a 
large fine from a major corporation, even if only occasionally, yields positive 
press.  Consequently, one could envision internal resistance to the creation of 
a new division that plunders from the power structure of the well-established 
Criminal Division (and possibly, the Civil Division).  Indeed, expanding the 
new division to encompass both civil and criminal enforcement through a 
Corporate Fraud Division would invite twice the resistance in that it would 
draw resources away from two divisions.
229
  Any resistance might be 
especially forthcoming in the aftermath of the creation of the National 
Security Division, which also pulled forces from the Criminal Division.  Yet, 
one could argue that the need for both the National Security Division and the 
Corporate Crimes Division arose out of the overwhelming bundle of matters 
handled by the single Criminal Division and the failure of the federal 
government to effectively fight threatening criminality that undermines our 
national security.  Quite likely, removing segments from the Criminal 
Division will enhance its functioning through better streamlining, while 
opening an opportunity to focus upon the detection, investigation, and 
prosecution of corporate wrongdoing. 
A final challenge raised in the context of this Article is the likelihood of 
political resistance to institutional reform.  An underlying factor of superior 
institutional design is the political support necessary to implement change.  
Politics is influenced by money and power.
230
  Those with economic means 
and power are often leaders in the business community who are frequently 
disinterested in aiding governmental oversight,
231
 and are far more interested 
 
228. See, e.g., FY 2008 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 11, at II-11 to 
II-32; Gurney, supra note 145, at 619 (recognizing the ―pressure to produce convictions coupled with 
limited resources‖).   
229. See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, 2008 BUDGET & SUMMARY REPORT, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2008summary/pdf/070_gla.pdf; U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIV., 
FRAUD SECTION ACTIVITIES REPORT (2008), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/ 
reports/2008/actrpt08.pdf. 
230. See OLSON, supra note 216, at 141–43 (observing that the interests of American 
businesses are well represented in American politics, despite their comparatively small size relative 
to labor organizations).  ―The number and power of the lobbying organizations representing 
American business is indeed surprising in a democracy operating according to the majority rule.  The 
power that the various segments of the business community wield in this democratic system, despite 
the smallness of their numbers, has not been adequately explained.‖ Id. at 142.  ―The multitude of 
workers, consumers, white-collar workers, farmers, and so on are organized only in special 
circumstances, but business interests are organized as a general rule.‖  Id. at 143.  
231. See ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE 
AMERICA DON‘T WANT YOU TO KNOW; WHAT YOU CAN DO TO FIGHT BACK 106–15 (2002) 
(former SEC chair Arthur Levitt recounting how ―the business lobby‖ and ―CEOs‖ successfully used 
Congress and the SEC to thwart reform efforts, such as that by the Financial Accounting Standards 
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in co-opting political leaders for governmental support of deregulatory 
measures.
232
  The struggle against powerful business interests using financial 
measures to gain the support of politicians is not new.
233
  Nevertheless, these 
are challenging times.  Economic crisis abounds, and, in an effort to avoid 
greater financial downturns, the government is bailing out those who caused 
the crisis, at the expense of those who were most harmed.  Since reform is 
often a matter of striking when the iron is hot,
234
 one must grant that the heat 
is fully on.
235
  If the current Administration seeks change, there is unlikely to 
be a better time than now. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The struggle to address corporate crime has increased, as the costs of 
corporate crime continue to mount.  Just as the physical threat of global 
terrorism threatens the security of people everywhere and requires a concerted 
effort to command a defense, so too do the costs of corporate crime, as it 
undermines security, creates dependency on foreign capital, destabilizes 
financial markets, destroys personal savings, and diverts public resources 
from benefiting the greater good to bailing out the corrupt. 
Corporations are not inherently evil, but they are structured to pursue 
profit and minimize firm costs, which is frequently accomplished by shifting 
 
Board to require that options be expensed on corporate income statements); Richard A. Posner, 
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 343 (1974) (stating that the 
economic theory of regulation rejects the use of the term ―capture‖ as ―inappropriately militaristic,‖ 
but recognizes that private interests may subvert regulation); Amy Borrus, SEC Reforms: Big Biz 
Says Enough Already, BUS. WEEK, Feb. 2, 2004, at 43 (detailing the efforts of corporate managers to 
stifle proxy reform); Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, A Legacy that May Not Last, BUS. WEEK, 
June 13, 2005, at 39 (discussing business lobbying efforts to frustrate proxy reform). 
232. See, e.g., Robert Manor & Stephen J. Hedges, Gramms Regulated Enron, Benefitted from 
Ties, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 2002, at 17 (reporting on the close relationship between Enron and former 
Senator Phil Gramm and his wife, Wendy Gramm, former chairwoman of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission).  As Commodity Futures Trading Commission chairwoman, Wendy Gramm 
moved to lift governmental oversight on energy contracts that Enron and others traded six days 
before she resigned her post and five weeks before she joined Enron‘s board of directors.  Id.  In 
December 2000, Senator Phil Gramm sponsored the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which 
included an exemption of electronic energy exchanges and is known as the so-called ―Enron 
loophole,‖ ―turning his wife‘s deregulation decision into law.‖  Id.; Ginger Szala, On Second 
Thought, FUTURES, Sept. 2007, at 10.  Senator Gramm had received more than $97,000 in campaign 
contributions from Enron.  See Manor & Hedges, supra. 
233. See DERBER, supra note 22, at 23–25 (―A Gilded Age business leader wrote, ‗It matters 
not one iota what political party is in power or what president holds reins of office.‘  The barons had 
no sentimental loyalty to either Democrats or Republicans because both had become parties of 
business, a pattern increasingly in evidence today.‖); SUTHERLAND, supra note 130, at 7–9. 
234. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of 
Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 186 (2007) (observing that reform moments can rise 
to spark legislation by bringing together a coalition of willing supporters against those with power to 
resist reform). 
235. See DERBER, supra note 22, at 333–39. 
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those costs to others.  Creating a Corporate Crimes Division provides a 
superior institutional design that can marshal the resources and the expertise 
necessary to direct a concerted assault on corporate crime. 
―[S]mall changes can have large democratizing effects.‖236  Creating a 
Corporate Crimes Division to focus national policy and to pursue fraudulent 
activity at the outset will undermine the temptation of big business to pursue 
profits at any cost, and protect individual investors and the public fisc from 
the fallout of corporate crimes.  Benefits gained from a cohesive national 
pursuit of corporate criminality well outweigh any risks associated with such 
a pursuit. 
 
 
 
 
 
236. ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT 
SMALL 2–3 (2007) (observing that ―in most democratic polities, the basic constitutional 
arrangements are no longer up for grabs,‖ and thus institutional design change is most likely to be 
effected on a small scale, but with potentially ―large‖ results). 
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